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Introduction 
Diplomacy is inarguably the central act through which international relations of all 
states is conducted. American diplomacy has been a longstanding tradition, beginning with 
the first American Ambassador to France, Benjamin Franklin, who set the precedent for the 
qualities of an ambassador and the roles of peacekeeping, negotiation, understanding, and 
representation. However, the role of a United States' diplomat has been forced to change 
within an increasingly globalized world with new state interdependency, technologies, and 
political situations. It has been stated "a real gap exists between the study of diplomacy and 
the study of most of the rest of international relations" (Sharp, 1998:  46).  
Most of  the standing literature agrees that diplomacy is in a decline, yet also agrees 
that diplomacy maintains an importance within international relations (Sharp 1999, 40) .  
Diplomacy within the U.S. Department of  State i s  being challenged to adapt to these 
changes as the American military is being used at a greater extent to take on traditional 
diplomatic functions. This study will analyze the particular challenges that U.S. 
Ambassadors meet within their daily work and attempt to define their role within 
international relations. In doing so we wil l  have a better understanding of what their 
current functions are. The methods used will be interviews conducted with former U.S. 
ambassadors who served in developing countries. 
These ambassadors will be chosen upon the criteria of the economic conditions in 
their host country using the United Nations Human Development Index (UN HDI) .  
Economic disparities are becoming a critical factor within state relations; therefore this 
study will mainly focus on diplomats who served in countries lower than "High Human 
Development" on the UN HDI .  Secretary of State Hilary Clinton recognizes that diplomacy is 
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rapidly changing to include international development initiatives alongside the standing 
traditional duties such as negotiations (Sharp and Wiseman, 2007 :56) . Ambassadors who 
have worked within the context of a developing country wil l  be able to provide the most 
useful view of this new diplomatic direction. 
To ful ly understand the role of Ambassadors, this thesis will also examine how they 
respond to international crises and how their role shaped the U.S. response and furthering 
relations with their host country. To do so, this study will look specifically at the crisis in 
Rwanda in 1994 and how the role of Ambassador David Rawson affected the U.S. response 
to the unfolding genocide. This will be done by using Allison's three-part model, which 
includes the rational policy level, the bureaucratic processes, and the organizational 
processes that form foreign policy decisions. This tool will provide a full overview of the 
context in which the Rwandan genocide took place and break down the standard operating 
procedures which ambassadors such as Rawson must work within. While  the U.S. response 
to such crises in the past has been labeled as "schizophrenic," Allison would argue that each 
decision made is seen at the time as the most rational (1969:  692) .  Testing Allison's models 
will help explain the lack of continuity on the part of the U.S. and what was the role of the 
ambassador in one specific case study. The findings wil l  also shed light on major events in 
which diplomacy and international development were indistinguishable from each other, 
as is the predicted direction of the future. 
Today we see international development and the vague term of "nation building" 
often being conducted by the American military. Many of the military missions currently 
taking place in Afghanistan and Iraq are under the title of "nation building," yet this is a 
term traditionally applied to the work of diplomats and the State Department. One 
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prominent military figure with vast experience in managing such missions and conducting 
diplomatic relations is General Anthony Zinni, the Unified Combatant Commander of the 
U.S. Central Command from 1998 to 2001.  By interviewing a former commander such as 
Zinni we will gain an alternative perspective to the definition of "diplomacy" and see how 
the military is able to take on more diplomatic duties, especially in lesser-developed 
countries. The role of our modern military is important in understanding how the role of a 
traditional diplomat has changed and how important international development is for U.S. 
national foreign policy. 
Currently the State Department and international development agencies such as the 
United States Agency for International Development are facing drastic funding cuts (Lester, 
2 0 1 1 :  1) .1 Yet it is recognized that the United States' role in bridging economic gaps with 
developing countries is crucial to sound diplomatic relations. The ambassador is the 
traditional figure who conducts diplomatic relations, yet there is a large scholarship gap 
that provides a firm understanding between the role of ambassadors and the greater 
interactions between states. More so, the diplomat's role is increasingly being undertaken 
by our military. Through interviews with former ambassadors and military commanders 
and through the application of Allison's rational policy method to the case of the Rwandan 
genocide, this study will fil l  in the existing gap in scholarship, give a clearer understanding 
of the diplomat's role and the military's role in conducting diplomacy, and examine the role 
that international development is taking within the United States' foreign relations. 
1 On July 2 7, 20 1 1  the Kaiser Daily Global Health Policy reported that the H ouse Appropriations Committee 
released the FY1 2  Foreign Relations Authorization Act that will slash State Department funding and foreign 
aid. The bill decreased the State Department and related agencies' budgets by $3.9 billion. It specifically cuts 
$488 million from USAID's budget (Kaiser Daily Global Health Policy Report, 201 1). 
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This thesis will first examine the existing literature and recognize the existing gap of 
a true understanding of American diplomacy within international relations. Next will be the 
application of Allison's rational policy analysis to the 1994 Rwandan genocide and a study 
of how our U.S.  foreign policy was formed based on decisions by President Clinton, 
Ambassador Rawson, and other actors within the State Department. After understanding 
the structure and operating procedures of U.S. ambassadors this thesis will use multiple 
interviews with former ambassadors to examine the current role of diplomats and how 
traditional diplomacy is changing, especially in regards to the importance of economic and 
social development. The final chapter of this thesis will continue looking at changes within 
the traditional diplomatic structure, focusing on the shift of nation-building activities from 
the U.S. State Department to the American military. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
The history of diplomacy is a very comprehensive category of research. Much of the 
l iterature gives chronological timelines of important historical events, treaties, and figures 
that detail how diplomacy has formed into what is in our present day. Stearns begins his 
review of diplomatic history with Italy, the f irst country to establish the position of a 
professional diplomat (2004: 140). For the purpose of this study, however, many of these 
marker details will not be discussed, although they can easily be found in much of the 
existing research. What are harder to find are broader connections between the idea of 
diplomacy and the events that have shaped it. Sharp concurs that much of the available 
literature has "dutiful" historical reviews, but notes that these "are usually self-contained 
affairs, not part of the main argument (1997 :615) .  So while examples of specific diplomats 
and treaties are important, this l iterature review will focus on the broader concepts that 
have been noted within the current research. 
Nicolson makes these connections through his own historical review in Diplomacy. 
The purpose of his review is show that diplomacy is an "essential element" to maintaining 
relations between all countries and that diplomacy is not a mere invention of a specific 
political system (1988 :  39).  While he does l ist important historical events, Nicolson devotes 
a large portion of his l iterature to providing historical examples of what he believes make a 
good diplomat. H e  cites seven "diplomatic virtues" that include truthfulness, good temper, 
precision, patience, calm, modesty, and loyalty. Stearns also includes historical examples of 
how these diplomatic qualities have been the precedent for all diplomats since the very 
start. He  uses Benjamin Franklin, who is considered to be the United States' first diplomat, 
as an example. 
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Stearns' literature suggests that Franklin set the precedent for our modern 
expectations of the qualities of a diplomat. Franklin was an expert on the culture, 
government, and societal norms of France and studied the language until he was fluent. He  
understood the problems the French government faced and the current issues that had to 
be dealt with. A deep and comprehensive knowledge such as this is why Americans expect 
our modern diplomats to study languages and pass an examination, such as the Foreign 
Service Test, which demands broad knowledge of international affairs. Sir Nicolas agrees, 
and writes that diplomats, or at the minimum the diplomat's staff, should "have studied the 
local traditions and character" of the country to which they represent their country (Lilley, 
2 004:  303) .  Here we can trace our current expectations of diplomats all the way to the 
qualities and actions of our nation's very first one. 
These expectations we have of our diplomats are very high. Much of the literature 
cites examples of the difficulties they must face professionally. Stearns states that 
diplomats must be both a symbol of their country and simultaneously a direct 
representative of his chief of state (1973:  156) . Diplomats are in a constant balancing act. 
Sharp adds that first and foremost, a diplomat is a symbol of his or her country. Often the 
role of the diplomat is viewed as a representative always negotiating for peace, yet Sharp 
corrects this idea by stating that diplomats understand there is much more to their work 
than the sole focus of advancing their own state's agenda (1997 :  41) .  They are committed 
both to peace and to saving their own leaders from themselves. Often they have difficulty 
when their leaders do not want what the diplomat believes is best for the relations with the 
country they work in. 
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Often diplomats see themselves as more aware than those they represent, which 
present tensions within their profession (Sharp, 1997:  616, 627) .  Seldom are there clear 
definitions for the exact role of a diplomat in common situations such as this, allowing for 
broad and often unclear duties. This is magnified by a fact both Sharp and Wiseman 
present; that each diplomatic situation is unique and different from every other (2007: 41) .  
The j ob a diplomat must carry out wil l  be defined by the political, social, and economic 
context in which they are working (Sharp and Wiseman, 2007 :  56). The literature presents 
the challenges from the ever-changing international landscape of which diplomats are at 
both times the glue and the actors who must push the world forward. 
A diplomat's role, while difficult, is said by many to be central to international 
relations. Sharp describes it as "an integral part of the minimal conditions securing the 
existence of international society" (Sharp, 1997:  618) .  It is the heart and the glue of how 
the world operates within the established international systems. Diplomats see themselves 
as "the steadying influence" in a fast-paced world where decisions are often made based on 
short-term goals. Diplomats are vital because they, in theory, stand as a voice for the long­
term goals (Sharp, 1 997 :  627) .  By knowing the culture, history, and operations of his or her 
resident country, l ike Nicolson and many other authors promote, a diplomat can more 
readily recognize what these goals are. Sharp's literature presents the role of the diplomat 
as maintaining relations between different actors who are "characterized by very thin 
social contexts" (Sharp, 1999: 2 1  ) .  
Today the importance of diplomacy within international relations is  strongly 
critiqued and questioned, adding another broad area of research. The nation-building and 
reconstruction process happening in Iraq provides a strong example of this. These duties 
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are the traditional j ob carried out by diplomats and others from the State Department. In 
March of 2002 the State Department created a "Future of Iraq Project" that involves 
seventeen different contributing groups and suggested activities that would promote a 
peaceful Iraq. This project identified its main challenge as to "transform these activities 
into a coherent and unified effort and to ensure that policy formulated in Washington is 
accepted internationally and effectively implement in Iraq" (Pickering and Schlesinger, 
2003 :  2 3) .  The State Department has made efforts to outline what they would do in our 
situation in Iraq. 
H owever, according to former United States Ambassador Thomas Pickering, the 
Department of Defense is the department that is leading the post-war governance in Iraq. 
This shift in roles does not seem surprising given that the overall solution from the State 
Department was a theoretical project with vague goals and challenges. Here we can see the 
j ob of peacekeeping and nation building shift from the State Department and its traditional 
diplomacy towards a shared inter-departmental discussion between the Pentagon and the 
State Department. However, Pickering and Schlesinger hardly mention the State 
Department's plan within this study, suggesting that the role of diplomats in our modern 
military presence is decreasing (2003 :  28) .  
Priest focuses on the role of  U .S .  military regional commanders-in-chief and their 
extraordinary access to resources and how their missions are increasingly focused on 
diplomatic missions. One chapter of her study examines Commander Zinni, a Unified 
Combatant Commander of U.S. Central Command who served from 1998 to 2001, who 
became a pseudo-diplomat within his region, informally ranked higher than U.S. 
ambassadors. General Zinni recognized the importance of understanding a country's 
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culture and how culture defined politics, just as a well-trained diplomat would. Zinni also 
recognized the importance of food relief, medical work, and economic assistance and 
refused to work on a mission unless the social structure of a tribe or a community was well 
understood (Priest, 2 003 :61- 77). This literature gives a strong example of how the military 
is increasingly heading missions and projects, such as nation building and development 
that are traditionally reserved for the U.S. State Department. 
The act of diplomacy being carried out by non- diplomats, such as the military, is 
part of the reason Sharp argues that the importance of diplomacy is in decline. More 
specifically, the role of the traditional diplomat is becoming less obvious as our nation uses 
the military and even humanitarian agencies to conduct diplomacy. Stearns also agrees, 
recognizing that we cannot continue to use diplomacy in the traditional sense (1996:10) .  
Stearns suggests that the Foreign Service change by shifting its focus from "geographic and 
functional bureaus" to developing more area specialization and foreign language skill 
(1973 :  65) .  Such an emphasis again refers to the important skil ls  and qualities Nicolson 
presents in his study that is traced throughout much of the existing research. 
The argument that diplomats do not posses the appropriate skills or qualities makes 
the central argument of a cause for their irrelevancy. Nicolson suggests that, "the art of 
negotiation requires a combination of certain special qualities which are not always to be 
found in the ordinary politician, nor even in the ordinary man" (Sharp, 1999: 5). Stearns 
also agrees that the best diplomats are "distinguished by their qualities rather than by their 
skills," suggesting people are born diplomats; the necessary qualities cannot be learned 
(Stearns, 1973: 1 54) . If such a unique set of skills is needed, but not easily found or 
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acquired, then perhaps many of our diplomats are naturally lacking the necessary 
foundations for this profession. 
As the qualities and skills of a diplomat are limited, the problems that must be faced 
using these certain qualities are increasing. Much of the current literature states that 
problems diplomats must face are too complicated to be answered with the traditional 
format. These problems include AIDS, terrorism, immigration and human rights, which 
Stearns argues can only be addressed when states find new ways to collaborate on 
solutions (1996:  17) .  Finding these difficult solutions will require a "greater diplomatic 
effort," meaning diplomacy must change and adapt to meet the modern needs of our world 
(Stearns, 1996 :  1 8) .  
Some researchers, such as  Cooper, believe that international issues once dealt with 
by diplomats are not just increasing but are completely changing. Because of globalization, 
diplomats must focus not just on political issues, but also those of trade and economics. Our 
cooperation with other nations includes humanitarian assistance during complex 
emergencies and natural disasters. 
One complex issue that defines the status and power of all countries is the level of 
economic development growth. Development is becoming increasingly important. 
Secretary of State Hilary Clinton published the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and 
Development Review in July of 2009. This publication reviewed the State Department and 
USAID and sought to coordinate U.S. diplomacy and development efforts, recognizing that 
diplomacy and development often overlap and should begin to "mutually reinforce" each 
other (2009 :  14) . Clinton discusses the importance of recognizing how development and 
diplomacy fit together. 
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Clinton first recognizes that development goals are often reached through 
diplomatic procedures. To increase the compatibility of these two areas, she focuses her 
report on three areas. First she suggests how to modernize and coordinate diplomacy 
between multiple U.S. governmental agencies, how to make development projects 
sustainable and have lasting results, and third how to create a stronger partnership 
between development and diplomacy (Clinton, 2010: 14). Clinton, in accord with Sharp and 
other scholars who understand the necessary adaptability of diplomats, states that, 
"although traditional diplomacy will always be critical to advancing the United States' 
agenda, it is not enough" to achieve her three defined goals. One example she gives is how, 
in our current times, a diplomat is likely to meet with a tribal elder in a rural village as their 
foreign counterpart, and the traditional formalities of pinstriped suits will be replaced with 
cargo pants (Clinton, 2010 :  15) .  
Clinton goes on to impress through her report that American citizens must come to 
understand that spending tax dollars on development and diplomacy is in their best 
interest, especially when used in developing countries such as the ones many of the 
ambassadors interviewed above worked in. Diplomacy and development is crucial in 
countries that are deemed as fragile or conflict zones (Clinton, 2010 :  2 3) .  It is becoming 
ever apparent and ever crucial that development should be at the forefront of U.S. 
diplomacy in both establishing and forwarding beneficial relations with other countries to 
create a more stable and peaceful world. 
Sharp warns against this expectation that governments have the responsibility to 
solve problems such as these. He suggests this causes a "dangerous cycle" in which 
governments begin international projects only to find that there are not enough resources 
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to continue them. Often this type of project is placed under the diplomat's responsibility 
and they are subj ected to other policies that should not be within their roles (Sharp, 1997: 
610) .  
Domestic issues are increasingly becoming blurred and integrated with 
international issues. Stearns believes these two spheres are more integrated than ever, 
because our foreign policy must operate within American commitments, priorities, and 
initiatives set in place through domestic politics (1973 :  165) . Along with Stearns' suggested 
steps, Jeffrey Cooper's research suggests that diplomats will have to learn to work and even 
negotiate with private organizations that operate outside of the traditional governmental 
structures (1999 :  2 2) .  Here we see the emergence of what Andrew Cooper calls "double­
edged diplomacy," where each act by a diplomat must be in respect to both international 
and domestic politics (1997 /1998:  178) . 
The current literature shows that adapting to these increasing and more complex 
demands is difficult. Yet it is inevitable that unpredictable political, social, and 
technological developments occur (Sharp, 1999: 39) .  If  diplomats cannot adapt, they 
become irrelevant. Situations such as the Iraq post-conflict resolution are becoming more 
common, where a non-traditional diplomacy is used. If the State Department is not needed, 
then traditional diplomats working under this agency are not needed. Some of the 
literature explores how this perceived irrelevancy has come about. 
Sharp believes that diplomats contribute to their own irrelevancy. The "aura of a 
'professional mystique' and 'defensive self-confidence' only isolates the profession (1999 : 
3 1) .  They seemingly hide behind pointless ceremonies and pretentious acts to support 
their reputations. Sharp and Wiseman justify such acts and remind us that "the thing to 
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remember is that the cloak of state and diplomatic ceremony is worn lightly and provides 
shelter for what is going on beneath" (2007 :  2 66). Nicolson also justifies these same acts by 
saying that diplomats use this "cloak" to form "solidarity and establish certain tacit 
standards which they all respect" (1988: 44) . 
H owever, Cooper acknowledges that there are many who think diplomats are far 
removed from the real problems and their solutions (1997 /1998:  174) . Nicolson's idea of a 
"diplomatic language" supports this view. Nicolson describes diplomatic language as the 
"conventional form of communication that maintains an atmosphere of calm, while 
enabling statesmen to convey serious warnings to each other" (1988:  1 38) .  This common 
language among diplomats used to be Latin, then French, and now includes English. Yet no 
matter what the language, even the syntax of phrases was altered so that the public could 
not understand. Nicolson also argues that the public is uninformed as to the real issues 
diplomats deal with, because these issues are too complex. This discrepancy between 
diplomats and the people they represent only adds to the support that diplomats are out of 
touch with the public and the "real world." 
Cooper believes that the duties of diplomats are not important now that 
international affairs are operated within bureaucracy and with improved communications 
through technology (1999:  2 1) .  Stearns touches on the problems found in bureaucracy; it 
can become so complicated that internal communications suffer, causing confusion and 
personnel issues. If diplomats are expected to change and adapt, reforms must first start 
internally (Stearns, 1973 :  163) .  However, there are no concrete examples of change or 
reform that the State Department could undertake in order to tangibly change their 
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operations. It is only acknowledged that reform must happen, but no specifics are cited in 
the current literature. 
Cooper argues that diplomats are not relevant anymore because the required duties 
are no longer suited to how international relations is conducted. He states that diplomacy 
is irrelevant. The political and strategic matters diplomats work for are no longer the heart 
of relations between countries (Cooper, 1999:  20) .  In fact these improved communications 
now allow domestic actors to communicate directly with international organizations or 
even foreign heads of states themselves, completely bypassing the diplomat. Yet this is not 
a new problem. Nicolson recognizes the technology of his time, which includes the steam 
engine, telegraph, airplane, and telephone, as substantially modifying the practice of 
traditional diplomacy (1988:  38) .  
Even though many others explore the decline of diplomacy, much of the same 
research still l ists examples of why diplomacy is needed. Diplomats are needed for 
important in-person contacts with officials such as the heads of states and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs contacts and to conduct meetings and conferences with these and other 
foreign affairs actors. Cooper seems to be in line with Sharp when he says that the "classic 
functions" of diplomacy, such as negotiation and representation, will continue, but the 
"form and substance will be significantly altered (1999: 2 1) .  These arguments comport 
with most of the other authors who recognize that diplomacy must change and adapt. 
While Sharp and Wiseman use globalization as a cause of the decaying relevancy in 
diplomacy, Cooper takes the opposite stance, he states that "diplomacy appears to have 
risen in importance" as a force that could be able to work within our world's increasing 
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interdependency (1997 /1998: 175). These contrasting authors provide examples of the 
differing opinions and views of the diplomat. 
Nicolson even supports the role of a diplomat, arguing that, "it will always be 
desirable that the foreign policy of any great country should be carried out by professionals 
trained in their business." However, this is not always the case of many diplomats who are 
politically appointed as ambassadors. It would be imperative to research the effectiveness 
of a career-long diplomat versus a president's political appointment. This particular 
literature suggests that an appointed diplomat acts "out of vanity and owing to the 
shortness of his tenure to seek for rapid successes . . .  and has not acquired the humane and 
tolerant disbelief which is the product of a long diplomatic career" (Nicolson, 1988:  39).  
A small portion of the existing literature provides exam pl es of such a situation. Paul 
Cellucci, a politically appointed ambassador to Canada, provides an example of the 
particular difficulties many political appointees face. Cellucci is described as having a steep 
learning curve when entering diplomacy, suggesting that he was not an expert as 
prescribed by many others. Cellucci is also described as not having "any instincts" or 
"grounding in foreign affairs," suggesting his shortcomings as a diplomat was a cause of his 
lack of necessary qualities (Harper, 2003:  718) .  He did not follow many of the ceremonial 
gestures that diplomats value and respect. Some argued he could not find a good balance 
between representing the United States while acting diplomatically to Canada, yet others 
believe him to be instrumental in certain negotiations between the two nations (Harper, 
2003 :  7 18) . 
This specific example of Cellucci as a diplomat provides insights into how the 
routine actions and duties of a diplomat can be viewed with different opinions. This 
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literature is rare because it follows an appointed diplomat, which can be analyzed 
differently than a career diplomat. Some literature does exist on career diplomats in the 
form of memoirs. One comprehensive memoir is former U.S. ambassador to Mexico, Jeffrey 
Davidow's, who had a 3 5-year long career within the Foreign Service. 
In Davidow's memoir, he recounts his four years as a diplomat to Mexico. It includes 
many of the complex issues that other authors have stated diplomats must face, such as the 
drug trade, immigration, political unrest, and free trade. It also includes typical meetings 
with Mexican officials, travels around the country to better understand the culture and 
local customs, and cites Davidow's knowledge of the foreign language, suggesting he was a 
good diplomat based on the qualities traced back to Benjamin Franklin. His memoir also 
provides a real-life view of the challenge diplomats face when balancing the United States' 
position on certain matters with their own personal views as well as juggling U.S. domestic 
politics when being physically removed from it (Davidow, 2 004 :1 -250). 
Other memoirs like Davidow's exist, including Ambassador James Lilley's 
experience in China, Joseph Wilson's experience in Iraq, and Richard Holbrooke's 
experience in Eastern Europe. What can be taken from this literature are anecdotal 
discussions of the ambassador and his diplomatic life. Most of the existing literature only 
focuses on high-profile ambassadors, often who have been involved in a particular tragedy 
or a controversial policy. Research is lacking on substantial examples of lesser-profile 
ambassadors but would be invaluable to examine how diplomacy is carried out daily, 
helping to better define its role, importance, and relevancy within international relations 
today. 
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Another need for more comprehensive research is the ambiguity of the definition of 
diplomacy. Sharp does not define diplomacy by negotiation, but rather by representation. 
Yet he states in some of his research that representation in its single term has three 
branches: the sovereign, the diplomat as a person, and the diplomat in the capacity as the 
sovereign (Sharp, 1997 :  6 1 1). He even recognizes that these definitions within the 
definition of representation have changed and become more blurred and complex along 
with the discrepancy of the multiple ways experts and others within the field define 
diplomacy - a fact he believes is a part of the problem and must resolved. Sharp believes 
there are two ways to define diplomacy: broadly and narrowly. If diplomacy is simply 
representation, or economic bargaining, or conflict resolution, it must be recognized and 
defined as such. 
Sharp and Wiseman agree that diplomacy is simply the art of negotiating (2 007:56) . 
Nicolson establishes this same definition in his earlier research and warns against 
confusing diplomacy as a synonym for "foreign affairs," including foreign policy (1988: xiii, 
1 38).  
This need for a strong and clear definition of diplomacy is found throughout the 
existing literature. Nicolson warns that the term "diplomacy" is consistently misused. He 
even goes so far as to suggest that the confusion with the conduct of foreign affairs stems 
from confusing the roles of what a diplomat should be carrying out, or falsely mixing policy 
with negotiation. Many use diplomacy to define both the "framing of foreign policy and its 
execution" which is a problem (Nicolson, 1988:  3) .  Yet even Nicolson's own definition of 
diplomacy seems somewhat vague. Nicolson describes diplomacy as "the  application of 
intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of 
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independent states" (1988: 122) .  This is a very encompassing definition, but does not 
specify what the "official relations" consist of. 
It is established that more research in the areas of specific diplomatic lives and a 
clear definition of the term "diplomacy" would be valuable. Even Sharp recognizes that 
research on diplomacy is very limited and not even considered in some major journals such 
as Diplomatic History (1999 : 44 ). He states, "The study of diplomacy remains marginal" 
(Sharp, 1999:  34) .  For something considered by most of the primary authors as central to 
international relations, diplomacy still remains poorly understood. 
It is understood, however, that diplomacy has been historically central to the 
world's affairs, and many of the prominent researchers believe it should remain central. Yet 
with increasing technology and complex problems that are harder to solve, it is arguable 
that the role of diplomats are becoming less and less relevant. The United States has 
examples of the military overstepping the traditional role of diplomacy carried out by the 
State Department and the tensions found among the existing diplomatic practices both by 
career-long and politically appointed ambassadors. Yet even through all of this, it is 
recognized that "diplomats and their trade remain important not j ust because of the 
residue of an age-old professional legacy but because of the value of their everyday 
activities in the contemporary world" (Cooper, 1997 /1998:  178) .  It is imperative to study 
these everyday activities among a more diverse pool of diplomats than what the existing 
research offers. By looking at the fundamentals of the practice of diplomacy today, it can be 
defined and its importance carved out in the changing and unpredictable arena of 
international relations. This will contribute to our understanding of the role of diplomacy 
in our modern era. 
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Focusing on the specific research of the 1994 Rwandan genocide as a crisis in which 
a diplomatic response was necessary, much literature exists studying the U.S. response of 
non-action to the situation. This thesis will use Graham Allison's three models to examine 
the Rwandan genocide. To briefly summarize Allison, his research three structured models 
to analyze the Cuban missile crisis and what decisions were made based on the dynamics 
among the three levels. Allison first looks at the United States' response to the Soviet 
emplacement of missiles in Cuba by analyzing each decision, such as the blockade, the last 
resort of an invasion, and even theoretical decisions including the decision to not act. 
Allison argues that the different national actors, diplomatic pressures, and routines call for 
a wider analysis of foreign policy decision making. Allison looks at multiple decision­
makers and influences during the Cuban Missile Crisis from the National Security Council to 
the Treasury. He  recognizes the importance of routines and regulations when our 
bureaucracies are dealing with certain situations, and overall he provides an example of 
how to include these multiple facets in examining the United States foreign policy in 
regards to the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison, 1969).  
While Allison's three-model theory helps to fol low the development of foreign policy 
decisions, other scholars such as Stephen Krasner believe that it is ultimately the President, 
and only the President, who decides what actions the U.S. will take. Krasner believes giving 
credit to the individuals within and procedures of a bureaucracy unjustly relieve the 
President of his specific responsibilities. He argues that especially in regards to foreign 
policy the President is the sole and final actor (1972 :  168). Krasner does not believe a 
three-model analysis such as Allison's is needed, but rather the focus should remain on the 
actions of the President, as he is the final decision-maker. 
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However, Allison's models and similar ones that analyze bureaucratic politics have 
widely been used to explain the Cuban Missile Crisis, American foreign policy in Vietnam, 
the Suez crisis, and others. (Krasner, 197 2 :  160) .  The impact Allison has left in the field of 
international relations is large, for his research proves that there is predictability and a 
structure to analyzing foreign policy that is testable (Allison, 1969:  690). The President is 
equipped with a large cabinet of advisors and numerous agencies that are designed to help 
form national decisions. While the President is ultimately the final decision-maker, 
Allison's model has helped the academic field to better understand the possible influences 
and perspectives the President was exposed to while making decisions. It is a natural 
transition to test All ison's  model on more recent international events such as the Rwandan 
Genocide. 
Powers argues U.S. diplomacy failed in Rwanda. First, U.S. representatives put too 
much trust in the Rwandan government, who were secretly planning the genocide. Second, 
due to the culture of the State Department, American diplomats did not want to intervene 
in the escalating violence for fear it would disrupt the peace process and Arusha Accords. 
Therefore they completely avoided confrontation when it was needed (Power, 2002 :  338) .  
Alan Kuperman believes that keeping peaceful relations i s  the primary role of the 
ambassador and of diplomacy. He says "To avert such violence over the long-term, there is 
no alternative to the time-consuming business of diplomacy and negotiation" (2 000:  112) .  
These scholars establish that diplomacy was indeed important within U.S. relations with 
Rwanda, an importance that can be further tested with Allison's three models. 
It is recognized by many scholars that Allison's three-model test was an important 
milestone for studying the bureaucratic influence on U.S. foreign policy that extends our 
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understanding from the narrow, single-actor understanding that was previously accepted 
(Bendor & Thomas, 1992 :  302 ;  Wagner, 197 4:43 7) .  Mitchell and Massoud analyze how 
decisions were made during the Iraq War by integrating individual and bureaucratic 
analyses. Mitchell and Massoud both agree that an integrative model, like the one Allison 
presents, is especially important when looking at the decision-making process during a 
crisis. (2009:  2 67). Although Allison's method is arguably outdated for our science, its 
comprehensive approach to different levels of analysis are still used and respected. 
Bendor and Hammond, while accepting the worth of Allison's study to the 
advancement of the field, re-analyze the nature of each of Allison's three models, 
concluding that some of the models' assumptions are ambiguous. They especially criticize 
Allison's second and third models as not accounting for complex human behavior and being 
too complicated to accurately apply to a case study. Instead of Allison's models helping give 
a better understanding of U.S. foreign policy, Bendor and Hammond go so far as to say that 
Allison's models could mislead people's understanding of how bureaucracies operate and 
how U.S. foreign policy is made (1992 :  3 2 1  ). This existing literature provides a foundation 
for analyzing foreign policy decisions and how the specific case of the Rwandan genocide 
helps define diplomacy and its role in the broader view of international relations. 
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Chapter 2: Allison's Application for United States Foreign Policy towards Rwanda 
Introduction 
United States ambassadors play a central role within international relations and the 
conduct of U.S. foreign policy. Often ambassadors are thought of as the primary 
representative of the United States, expected to be an expert in the host country's culture 
and politics, and serve as a direct source of information for the President (Rawson, 
telephone interview) . Therefore ambassadors should ostensibly have a distinctive part in 
the formation of U.S .  foreign policy. This formation, as Graham Allison argues, is based on 
integrative and rational policy decisions on multiple levels within the U.S. government. 
These levels can be broken down into three models: the national level, where the most 
"rational" choice is chosen, the organizational model, which focuses on the standard 
operating procedures that must be followed, and the bureaucratic politics model where 
competing views from within a single department vie for personal agendas (Allison, 1969: 
690). 
This study will look at a different, large event within international relations: The 
Rwandan genocide in 1994. U.S. foreign policy has been described as "schizophrenic" and 
this description is especially clear when applied to the U.S. response to the crisis in Rwanda 
(Allison, 1969:  692) .  The response was practically nothing; President Bill Clinton never 
once convened a meeting with his advisors to discuss possible options in Rwanda. Yet 
Rwanda is now considered to be "the fastest, most efficient killing spree of the 20th 
century" (Power, 2002: 3 34) . 
There was a U.S .  ambassador stationed in the Rwandan capital, Kigali, with a ful l  
embassy staff with on-the-ground intelligence of the unfolding violence in 1994. Yet in the 
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literature on the Rwandan genocide and the role of the U.S. Ambassador David Rawson is 
rarely even brought up. Often the literature only mentions President Clinton's failure to act 
and the United Nations' failed peacekeeping mission describe how the United States and 
the international community allowed such a horrific, arguably preventable event to occur. 
There is a lack of analysis on the United States' primary representative, negotiator, and on­
the-ground information source: the ambassador. If the ambassador is central to the 
conduct of international relations and implementation of U.S. foreign policy, then their 
influence must be understood. 
Looking at the case of the Rwandan genocide, this study will use Allison's three 
models to study President Clinton's choice of non-action and how it was chosen as the best 
policy, the strengths and limitations of the State Department in influencing the U.S. 
response, and finally the interactions and personal agendas of individuals who were 
involved in the decision-making. Along with this case study an interview with former 
ambassador David Rawson will be used to more completely understand the role of the 
ambassador, specifically. Testing Allison's three models will provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the multiple parties, views, and influences that led to the U.S. foreign policy 
decision regarding Rwanda. It will provide a clearer understanding of the already 
established importance of diplomacy within international relations, especially when 
looking at such a crisis as the Rwandan Genocide. An interview with former ambassador 
David Rawson will complement Allison's method to see how his role impacted U.S. foreign 
policy and what the consequences these decisions had on Rwanda. 
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Methodology 
This research will be a case study, using previous studies on the Rwandan genocide, 
the Clinton administration, and the role of the State Department as the primary resources. 
U.S. Department of State cables will also be used. Previous interviews conducted by 
Frontline will be analyzed as they provide a wide range of questions to which the 
responses of multiple people within the State Department are recorded, verbatim. A 
telephone interview with the former ambassador to Rwanda, Ambassador David Rawson, 
will complement these existing interviews.2 These questions were decided upon in order to 
better understand Ambassador Rawson's role in Rwanda, what standard operating 
procedures were followed, and how an individual such as himself fit into the large 
bureaucracy of the State Department. These questions wil l  help develop a stronger source 
of data for Model I I, the one most criticized for being too vague. Additionally, these 
questions will add insight into the U.S. on-the-ground representative who represents both 
the U.S. President and the American people in carrying out foreign policy. Many of these 
questions have not been asked to Ambassador Rawson in previous public interviews and 
will advance the existing research as well as help advance this case study. 
Background 
First it is important to understand some background of the Rwandan genocide and 
the context of the state of the international politics at the time. This will allow a thorough 
analysis of Allison's first model and the rational-policy choice at the national level. 
Samantha Power provides what is perhaps the most detailed review of the Rwandan 
Genocide and how the decisions and context of the international community influenced 
2 This research protocol was approved by the Eastern Ill inois University Institutional Review Board on 
November 1 8, 2 0 1 1 .  File Number: 1 1 - 1 56. 
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decisions (2002). Rwanda was comprised of two main ethnic groups: the Hutus and the 
Tutsis. When Rwanda gained its independence in 1961 the Hutus controlled the 
government and began discriminating against and killing Tutsis, causing half of the Tutsi 
population to flee into bordering countries (Kuperman, 2000 :  100) .  Over the years these 
displaced Tutsis invaded Rwanda, trying to take back their country from the Hutus. In 1993 
the Arusha Accords were signed; an agreement that both sides would cease-fire and the 
Hutus would govern with opposition parties and a Tutsi minority. United Nations 
peacekeepers were sent to ensure that both the Hutus and the Tutsis would fulfill the 
agreement. However on April 6th, 1994, Hutu extremists shot the Rwandan and the Burundi 
Presidents' plane down, immediately starting a systematic genocide (Power 2002 :  329) .  
Through this brief history of  the main foundations for the Rwandan Genocide, 
multiple warnings were issued to the United States and President Clinton of ensuing large­
scale violence. These warnings came from Human Rights Watch, the State Department, and 
even the Central Intelligence Agency (Power, 2002 :  3 30) . Yet these warnings were largely 
ignored, not because of illegitimacy or unbelief, but because of the context of the U.S. 
foreign policy. 
Application of Model I 
To apply Allison's first model this study will look at President Clinton and his 
administration's overall attitude toward the events in Rwanda and their decision-making 
process. At the time violence began in Rwanda and the U.S. government began receiving 
warnings of an escalating situation, a response seemed unable to do. At this same time, the 
United States was involved in failing missions in Bosnia and in Somalia where the missions 
seemed very similar to the humanitarian mission that Rwanda was demanding (Power, 
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2 0 0 2 : 3 40) In the other African country of Somalia the United States had already 
experienced military casualties and a failed peacekeeping mission (Burkhalter, 1994: 44 ). It 
is easy to understand that the administration did not want to put the U.S. into another 
failing mission, and believed they were learning lessons from the previous two 
interventions. Straus describes the Clinton administration has having "no appetite" for 
another humanitarian effort (Strauss, 2006:  48) . It seems the violence in Rwanda came at a 
poor time for the United States to believe in a successful mission. 
The overall administration is described by Richard Hass as lacking a coherent 
framework in foreign policy (1997:  114) .  Even more, Burkhalter describes President 
Clinton as only interested in foreign affairs when the U.S. was directly affected, and Rwanda 
was viewed as having no direct affect on the U.S. (1994: 46). In fact, Clinton viewed most of 
the world as having little effect on the U.S. Barry Schweid describes Clinton's attitude for 
foreign policy as "an approach to the world that makes few demands on his secretary of 
state." (1994: 1 3 8) .  President Clinton was even criticized by Henry Kissinger as making 
random, unrelated decisions when responding to crises (2010 : 2 68) . Having a weak 
structure to foreign policy and the personal attitudes of the President help explain why 
Clinton chose not to respond to Rwanda. 
However, Dumbrell looks at Clinton's foreign policy legacy over a longer period and 
believes that it was not as sporadic and unclear as many other scholars have concluded. 
Dumbrell suggests that Clinton focused his decisions on his mission of pushing "economics 
first." Because of this primary agenda Clinton formed his foreign policy around the ideas of 
globalization and free trade. He believed U.S. interests abroad should lie with economic 
interests, not humanitarian ones. Dumbrell also examines the difficult time period during 
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which Clinton was president. International politics had shifted from a Cold War setting into 
one where the United States was the new hegemonic leader, and Dumbrell reminds us that 
this was not an easy shift. President Clinton, according to this research, was simply making 
decisions based on the state of domestic and international politics of the 1990s (2010: 
2 69).  
President Clinton did create a framework for U.S. foreign policy with the United 
Nations by introducing a directive of guidelines for how the United States would become 
involved in U.N.  missions. This directive was introduced on May 5th while the genocide in 
Rwanda was taking place. This directive, called the Presidential Decision Directive 25, 
stated that any U.S.  involvement must be to advance American interests (Burkhalter, 1994: 
48) . Rwanda, as stated before, was not considered an American interest. 
Looking at how the State Department operated within Rwanda, examining the 
embassy in Kigali will help understand State Department operations. The embassy 
established in Kigali was a small mission, due to the low interest the U.S. had in Rwanda. 
According to the National Security Archives this embassy was lacking a political officer, a 
position that analyzes the political events taking place and how the U.S. should respond, a 
C IA representative, and a defense attache. Ambassador Rawson and Deputy Chief of 
Mission Joyce Leader did most of this work (Ferroggiaro, 2004). The amount of resources 
given to help formulate U.S. foreign policy is based on the U.S. interests toward the country, 
and even George Moose admits that Rwanda was no where near a top priority for the U.S. 
(Frontline, 2003) .  
Even more factors led  to the disinterest of American leadership. While the United 
Nations was calling for U.S. involvement in Rwanda and for the U.S. to send or help pay for 
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troops, the overall  attitude towards U.N. peacekeeping was very skeptical. In fact the 
United States had been invested in a peace process in Rwanda for over three years, starting 
in 1991  (Power, 2002 :  34 7) . The U.S. Congress was not going to support another 
peacekeeping mission when our country already owed half a billion dollars in dues and 
peacekeeping costs already (Power, 2002 :  341) .  Peacekeeping at the time was looked upon 
as too idealistic and ineffective, especially when the Belgium U.N. peacekeepers were so 
easily killed at the beginning of the violence in Rwanda. Michael Doyle and Nicholas 
Sambanis provide the steps for effective peacekeeping, but ultimately note that low levels 
of economic development may motivate actors to violence, no matter how strong the 
peacekeeping mission (2000: 782).  Not even the U.N. agreed to the requests from the 
Commander of U.N. peacekeeping forces in Rwanda (Power, 2002 :  342) .  Both in the U.S. 
and internationally, another peacekeeping mission seemed to be thought of as too 
redundant with less-than-desirable outcomes. 
Application of Model I I  
With the political situation and the personal views of President Clinton in place we 
can move on to Allison's second model of the organizational processes. We would 
anticipate that the decisions made in response to the situation in Rwanda were affected by 
the standard operating procedures that are fol lowed within the State Department. For the 
Rwandan genocide, this study wil l  look at the State Department and how their own 
standard operating procedures guide the flow of information and decision-making. 
Ambassador David Rawson, looking back on the event, describes that himself and the State 
Department were "very heavily invested" in bringing peace to Rwanda. In his interview, 
Rawson describes his main objectives, given to him by Washington, were to push forward 
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the Arusha Accords for peace (Rawson, 2 0 1 1) .  Yet it is recognized that other effective 
measures could have taken place. For example, the U.S. could have jammed the radio 
broadcasts that were forwarding the ethnic killing, yet the Pentagon deemed it illegal. 
(Burkhalter, 1994: 51) .  Power includes that this push for peace was pursued "almost 
blindly" because they were simply the orders that must be fol lowed. 
Ambassador Rawson describes his role in pushing for peace by providing technical 
expertise to the two conflicting parties in Rwanda and giving funding to the organizations 
that supported this peace negotiation. A part of this push for peace comes from the 
expectation that the Ambassador will serve as both a representative of the President of the 
United States and of the policies of the current administration. Rawson explains that every 
ambassador understands this role, as the first thing any ambassador receives is a letter 
from the president's administration stating that their primary concern is the protection of 
American citizens and the promotion of American interests. Ambassadors understand that 
they must do what they are asked and expected to do, which is to keep regular contact with 
Washington, accurately report on situations within the host country, and recommend to 
Washington what is appropriate for U.S. foreign policy. With this foundation understood, 
Rawson served with these expectations and precisely followed his instructions. (Rawson, 
2 0 1 1) .  
When violence started in  1994 the immediate reactions of  Ambassador Rawson and 
the international community were to keep pushing for a peace agreement. Even when a 
different solution or could have been considered, the State Department followed its own 
precedent and kept pushing for the goal they had already set. Even after Rawson and all 
Americans had been evacuated and the situation in Rwanda was ful ly understood, the 
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response was still to create a peacekeeping force (Frontline, 2003) .  This shows the attitude 
within the State Department and the drive of those carrying out U.S. foreign policy to 
achieve the goal and follow the instructions that have been given, even if it becomes a blind 
and worthless fight. This standard operating procedure shaped a failed U.S. foreign 
response to Rwanda, and could not allow other solutions to be explored. 
Power briefly describes the actions of U.S. Ambassador Rawson immediately after 
the Rwandan President's plane was shot down on April 6, 1994. While the Ambassador had 
sent many messages and warnings of increased tensions, the morning after the plane was 
attacked he  decided to leave the country and suggested that all U.S. personnel be 
evacuated. He  is quoted as thinking primarily of Americans and his first decision made in 
response to the Hutu violence was to evacuate our citizens (Frontline, 2003) .  
In a symbolic gesture, Ambassador Rawson left Rwanda in  the very last car, after 
everyone else had gone before him. In response to leaving, along with the deputy, in the 
last car out of Kigali Ambassador Rawson replied emphatically, "That's what you do" 
(Rawson, 2 0 1 1) .  This signified a successful evacuation and was promoted and hailed as 
such by the State Department, even though thirty-five U.S. personnel were killed during 
these three days (Power, 2002 : 3 52) .  Here we see that the State Department was content, 
even with losing some personnel, because the standard operating procedures were 
properly followed to a ceremonious degree. In an interview, Ambassador Rawson recalls 
how he was carrying out the policies that were given to him and was constantly aware of 
his role as an official of the U.S. government. He says, "There had to be a very close focus on 
what it is we [were] supposed to do . . .  in order to do what we had been instructed to do so." 
He goes on to say that much of his work was "in carrying out .. .instructions" (Frontline, 
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2003) .  This shows that as an ambassador this is a strong emphasis of following instructions 
and the standard operating procedures given by the State Department. Even when the 
violence began, Ambassador Rawson suggested to the U.S. to keep some embassy staff in 
Kigali to continue pushing for peace, although the final decision was to evacuate everyone. 
When asked about this evacuation, Rawson again described the details of this 
procedure. He explained that the convoy was made up of over 100 cars with 400 people, all 
whom were directly or indirectly associated with the United States, and that he indeed did 
leave in the last car, because, as he stated, 'That's what you do." This procedure is fol lowed 
so closely even when it is not practical. While Ambassador Rawson left in the last car, as 
stated before in a ceremonious gesture, his car soon took its place in the middle of the 
convoy so it could communicate with the front and the back as the cars drove out of 
Rwanda (Rawson, 2 0 1 1) .  This standard operating procedure is a prime example of simply 
following the rules because that is what is expected, and afterward adjusting them for 
safety and practicality purposes. 
In another standard procedure of the State Department, this agency carefully chose 
how to describe the events in Rwanda to a point of confusion. The State Department 
spokesperson Christine Shelly refused to use the term "genocide." Instead she would only 
refer to the events in Rwanda as "acts of genocide" and could not describe the difference 
between the two terms (Power, 2002 :  359). 
The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose talks about the 
argument over the term genocide. (Frontline, 2003) .  The State Department was caught up 
in incredibly specific language that was both diplomatic and inoffensive, while arguably not 
portraying the ful l  extent of the genocide that was taking place in Rwanda. Even 
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Ambassador Rawson was quoted as being hesitant to use the term "genocide" in the case 
that the State Department was over-exaggerating the crisis before all the facts were 
analyzed (Burkhalter, 1994: 50). Here the standard operating procedures of publicly using 
the most precise and accurate terms overruled the importance of relaying the events that 
were already commonly thought of as genocide. 
The chain of command within the State Department must also be examined. If 
Secretary of State Christopher, along with President Clinton, were never in favor of 
intervention into Rwanda, any information coming from within the ranks would have still 
been relatively ineffective. Moose says his department should have been more aggressive 
in pushing their information up the hierarchical chain within the State Department. Moose 
cannot recollect the content of his meetings with Christopher on the subject of Rwanda, but 
recall s  clearly that Rwanda was a subject at morning meetings with Deputy Secretary of 
State Strobe Talbott. Yet even Moose recognizes that Talbott was not heavily engaged, but 
hypothesizes that it was perhaps the lack of a true request to those in higher leadership 
positions to examine the problem and help those who had been working continuously for a 
solution (Frontline, 2 003) .  Moose's account shows that the Secretary of State was not 
involved and that those below him were not invested, either. 
In 1994 Madeleine Albright was the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and 
therefore was aware of the United Nations' strategy to send a peacekeeping force to help 
stop the violence in Rwanda. Before heading into a briefing on the genocide in Rwanda, 
with the Rwandan Patriotic Front representative Claude Dusaidi, Albright received a memo 
reminding her that she should be mostly in a "listening mode" and only give general 
sympathy to Rwanda. She was not allowed to even hint that the U.S. would actively 
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respond. Even though Albright met four times with Dusaidi, she acted on instructions given 
from higher up within the bureaucracy (Power, 2002 :  3 59) . Here we see Albright, the 
ambassador who is working directly with Rwandan sources and UN peacekeeping 
development following instructions and the agenda pre-set for her within the State 
Department. U.S. foreign policy was not developed because of the information passed to 
Albright within these meetings, but instead it was developed by her predetermined 
responses. 
However, a contrasting story is told in accounts of Albright's contribution to the U.S. 
response to the genocide. In a Frontline interview, Albright attributes the failure of a U.S. 
response to a lack of information about what was going on in Rwanda. She says it was not 
"high on the agenda" because there were not frequent reports within the State Department, 
she does admit to having instructions on how to vote within the United Nations considering 
the peacekeeping forces. The three options were to support the peacekeeping efforts, 
withdraw the troops completely, or to only have some reinforcement. Her instructions 
were to support the withdrawal although she did not agree with them. During a meeting, 
she chose not to call the State Department but instead to call the National Security Council, 
headed by Tony Lake, the National Security advisor who was an expert on Africa (Frontline, 
2 004) .  
Yet when the National Security Council heard that Albright already had instructions 
on which option to support, they advised for her to follow them. It was not until later that 
after she argued for new directions did she get them; she was allowed to support the option 
of the middle option. Here is another example of how U.S. foreign policy is defined through 
instructions that come from within the bureaucracy and not by the personal decisions of 
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the chosen representatives. And just like Rawson, Albright describes a lack of influence 
because "the system did not manage to push the information up high enough to people 
making decisions" (Frontline, 2004) .  The top decision-makers were not pushed to be 
actively aware of the situation because of the power structure and the chain of command 
within the State Department. 
Application of Model I I I  
Moving to Allison's third model of bureaucratic politics, much of the existing 
l iterature explains individual roles within the State Department that helped form what 
decision was made. We have already looked at Ambassador Rawson's role and his initial 
decision to swiftly evacuate Americans from Rwanda. Looking at the State Department as a 
whole will help discover how it works to influence U.S. foreign policy. First, Newt Gingrich 
gives an account of the organizational processes within the State Department, arguing that 
it suffers from an ineffective organizational structure (2003 :43) .  He even goes on to 
emphasize that the State Department lacks sound management, accountability, and a 
strong leadership. The lack of these crucial elements can help to explain the lack of 
influence the State Department had in creating an effective U.S. response to the Rwandan 
Genocide. 
The top-ranking official within the State Department at this time was Secretary of 
State Warren Christopher. Christopher is described as completely loyal to President Clinton 
and that he viewed his first job at making sure President Clinton did not act in a rash 
manner (Schweid, 1994:  142) .  Like President Clinton, Christopher described the nature of 
U.S. foreign policy as focusing on shaping a world that will be in accordance with U.S. 
interests and values, making it a safer and more secure place that will provide the U.S. with 
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open economic opportunities (1995: 6). In 1995 he reported on such opportunities and the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy. He only mentioned Rwanda once in the context of the U.S. 
helping to establish a war crimes tribunal there, and assuring that our diplomatic efforts 
would strive toward a peace and reconciliation process (1995:  15) .  Christopher seemed to 
share the exact views with the President on not risking involvement in any conflicts where 
U.S. interests could not be benefited. 
Another major player within the State Department was Joyce Leader, as mentioned 
above, who was the Deputy Chief of Mission in Rwanda. Even though she knew at 8 a.m. the 
morning after the president's plane was shot down that the Hutu were systematically 
killing Tutsi, when she returned to the U.S. she was rarely consulted. In fact she was 
instructed not to deal directly with her sources in Kigali (Power, 2002 :  365) . Power tries to 
explain this counter-intuitive treatment of Leader. She states that within the State 
Department, African specialists such as Leader had the least political clout of all the 
regional specialists. People such as Leader, due to the internal politics and culture of the 
State Department, had the least chance of affecting the outcome of U.S. foreign policy. 
Allison's third model of analyzing the internal politics of a specific organization is shown 
through the actions and limitations of multiple players within the State Department who 
dealt with Rwanda. 
Analyzing the new role of Ambassador Rawson after evacuating Rwanda, we can 
clearly see the internal differences within the State Department. Rawson describes his 
work as being "actively engaged." At his level there was teleconferencing, memos on new 
strategies for troop deployment, and keeping informed of the on-the-ground situation. 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell was in contact 
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with the cabinet director of Rwanda's Ministry of Defense Colonel Theoneste Bagosora who 
is believed to have been the coordinator for the genocide. In his official cables to Bagosora, 
Bushnell is clearly demanding a stop to the killings and urging, again, peace talks. Yet even 
though Rawson and his colleagues were working on forming a U.S. response to the 
situation in Rwanda, he states that "the problem [was] that we weren't . . .able to move the 
bureaucracy" (Frontline, 2003).  This proves to be true in the fact that Bushnell sent 
updates on Rwanda to the Secretary of State each day, yet it can be assumed that these 
updates did not influence the highest position in the State Department. Yet when asked 
about this inability to "move the bureaucracy," Rawson explains that is essentially 
bureaucratic conflicts that hinder the decision-making process (Rawson, 2 0 1 1) .  
These internal conflicts occur over which tactics o r  strategies t o  use, and argues that 
the only way to overcome this inevitable struggle is by an intervention of the president. 
Rawson states that if the President were to have ordered the State Department to resolve a 
solution as quickly as possible, the tedious bureaucratic procedures and disagreements 
could have been easily avoided such as the long loan procurements or arguments over 
army personnel carriers. Burkhalter gives a lengthier account of such banters, saying that 
the Pentagon and the U.N. negotiated for weeks over such details as the type of wheels that 
should be on tanks. Yet it was not only the internal procedures of the State Department but 
also those of the United Nations that very much slowed down the development of a 
solution to the violence in Rwanda (Rawson, 2 0 1 1) .  The Department of Defense also 
recognized the "excruciating pace" of the negotiations (Burkhalter, 1994: 51 ). Even George 
Moose, the Secretary of African Affairs, describes the workings of the State Department at 
this time as "Bureaucracy at its worst" (Rawson, 2011) .  
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Daniel Drezner takes Allison's model of bureaucratic politics and instead of applying 
it to individual actors within one bureaucracy; he views each bureaucracy as having a 
specific agenda, competing with other agencies. The bureaucracies become Allison's 
individual players. The outcome of the competition among the different agencies is foreign 
policy. If we look at the State Department's role through the Drezner's lens, we can clearly 
see that the State Department has a unique culture that is bred within its own institution. 
Drezner's findings suggest that the existence of a strong organizational culture, such as the 
State Department's, can hinder the implementation of their ideas within foreign policy. 
(2000 :  735) .  Drezner offers a slightly different perspective of testing Allison's third model, 
one that can still explain the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the State Department due to 
its unique culture of procedures. 
Conclusion 
Allison's three models accurately give a comprehensive understanding of how the 
U.S. foreign policy was formed in response to the Rwandan genocide during 1994. While 
the President is the final decision-maker, on-the-ground information comes through our 
U.S. ambassadors in their foreign posts, which all follow a set of standard operating 
procedures. Part of their role is to advise U.S. foreign policy and work within the State 
Department who sends information up the chain, eventually to the President and his 
advisors. Therefore it is important to consider these other factors when looking at the 
Clinton administration's decision of non-action in the face of the fastest genocide of our 
time. Allison provides the methodology to analyze these other factors and help to explain 
why inaction was seen as the most rational choice during the events. 
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Using Model I helps sort through the President's personal attitude toward U.S. 
foreign policy and what lessons Clinton was trying to learn from, such as the failed 
humanitarian interventions in Somalia and Bosnia. Model I I  focuses on the role of 
Ambassador Rawson and how the carrying-out of set instructions shapes U.S. foreign 
policy. Model I I I  examines the internal actors within the State Department and who held 
the power to either respond to the Rwandan information or to ignore it, and how this 
information becomes lost within bureaucratic politics. Together these three levels of 
analysis create an overall picture of the multitude of actors involved within the formation 
of U.S. foreign policy, from those with power to those unable to push the agenda they 
thought most important. It is not just enough to use President Clinton's personal attitudes 
as a justification for the U.S. response, but to look at who were the channels of information 
and where the power rested within the bureaucracies. This is where Allison's own work 
becomes most beneficial and can be accurately applied to the 1994 genocide. 
Some limitations to this research do exist. While  this specific study benefited from a 
telephone interview with former Ambassador Rawson it was not possible to interview all 
other major actors involved during the Rwandan genocide, even though many recorded 
public interviews were used for data. The information for each model was not equal; much 
less information was found on President Clinton's personal actions during the genocide. 
The accounts of his attitudes and approaches toward U.S. foreign policy are through those 
who worked with him. Much more information exists on how President Clinton regretted 
not acting in Rwanda after the fact, and the development work his foundation is doing 
today. Models I I  and I I I  were much more heavily analyzed as much more information and 
interviews existed. 
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The use of Allison's three models must rely heavily on qualitative case studies. In 
case studies it will always be difficult to include every actor involved or to scientifically 
approach individuals' personality traits and outside factors that may have influenced their 
decisions or actions. Yet this three-model approach serves to look beyond the narrow 
approach of examining only the president's decisions and reaches to further understand 
the dynamics of other leaders and the structure of the bureaucracy involved in the 
decision-making. This research serves as an example of how Allison can be applied and 
accurately account for the decisions of multiple actors within the formation of U.S. foreign 
policy. Allison's method can continue to be applied to other major events in U.S. foreign 
policy and how the government molds a response. 
In regards to Rwanda, it is important to realize that the United States eventually did 
recognize that the situation in Rwanda was much more severe than the top decision­
makers first realized and that a response was needed. The response came after most of the 
killing was done and involved significant humanitarian relief, of which Ambassador 
Rawson became a part (Rawson, 2011) .  In later years Madeleine Albright, as Secretary of 
State in 1997, was the first one from the U.S. government to formally admit that the 
international community should have taken a more active response to the genocide in 
Rwanda and acknowledged earlier that the violence was, indeed, genocide (Lippman, 2000:  
1 15) .  Burkhalter divides the genocide into five different phases, recognizing that in the fifth 
phase - the mass immigration of Rwandan refuges - the United States finally responded 
with humanitarian assistance, visits to the refugee camps. Rwanda became a top priority 
within the State Department, the Pentagon, and within the Clinton administration to form a 
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creative and effective response to the existing problems in the aftermath of the killings 
(Burkhalter, 1994:  44 ) . 
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Chapter 3 :  The Role of the Diplomat and How Development is Changing Traditional 
Diplomacy Practices 
Introduction 
United States ambassadors serve as the face of U.S. foreign policy abroad, 
representing the President and the American public. Being an ambassador is a very 
distinguished and honored position, one that has a historical tradition of respect and 
formality. Ambassadors used to be the only communication between a foreign government 
and the United States, but in today's world with increased technologies, complex global 
markets, and altogether more and faster routes of communication, their traditional role is 
fading. Yet most scholars, as previously stated, agree that diplomats are still an integral 
part, arguably the center, of U.S. relations. However, most of these scholars also agree that 
the role of our U.S .  diplomats is not completely understood. This chapter will focus on 
understanding the role of our U.S. ambassadors through personal interviews with eight 
former ambassadors.34 These ambassadors were chosen based on the economic status of 
the country in which they served and their availability.5 No ambassadors from countries 
that are considered to have a very high human development index participated in an 
interview. 
3 The ambassadors chosen for interview were as follows, along with their time of service and host countries: 
1. Hugh Douglas Barclay, El  Salvador 2003-2007 2. George Bruno, Belize 1994-1997 3 .  Phillip Hughes, 
Barbados and Eastern Caribbean, 1990-1993 4. john Maisto, Venezuela 1997-2000, Nicaragua 1993- 1996 5. 
Thomas Melady, Burundi 1 969- 1972, Uganda 1972-1973 6. David Miller, Tanzania 1 9 8 1 - 1984, Zimbabwe 
1984- 1986 7. Pete Peterson, Vietnam 1997-2001 8. David Rawson, Rwanda 1993- 1996. 
4 This research protocol was approved by the Eastern I llinois University Institutional Review Board on 
November 1 8, 2 0 1 1. File Number: 1 1 - 156. 
5 The countries from which the former ambassadors served are largely considered developing by the United 
Nations standards. The UN list of Least-Developed Countries can be found at 
http://www.unohrlls .org/en/ldc/2 5/. Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi are on this list. Rwanda and Zimbabwe 
are considered to have low human development, El Salvador, Vietnam, and Nicaragua are considered to have 
medium human development, and Belize and Venezuela are considered to have high human development. 
The data is given here: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/profiles/. 
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My interviews with the former ambassadors will seek to uncover how each 
individual defined their role and function in representing the United States. Responses 
included how the ambassadors carried out their day-to-day tasks, what they viewed as 
their most significant accomplishments, and how they integrated international 
development initiatives into their work within the host country.6 My hypothesis is that the 
traditional work of diplomats in making peace treaties and ongoing negotiations is now 
changing to include more social and economic development initiatives. It is no longer 
formal treaties that keep the United States and other countries at peace, but instead it is in 
using our extensive resources for developing other countries that will keep relations 
steady. 
How Former Ambassadors Define Their Role 
The first step to understanding a diplomat's role is how they themselves define their 
own function. Ambassador John Maisto, who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua 
from 1993 to 1996 and then as the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela from 1997 to 2000, 
perhaps stated his role most bluntly: the ambassador is the special representative of the 
U.S. president.7 He reiterated common U.S. governmental responsibilities: the President, 
along with the Executive Branch, is responsible for carrying out foreign relations under the 
Constitution. The State Department and all of the U.S. ambassadors are a part of the 
Executive Branch. The ambassadors have the responsibility of carrying-out the foreign 
policy that is decided upon by the U.S. President and Congress, within their host country. 
The ambassador is used to engage directly with the members of a foreign government and 
6 The interview questions asked to each ambassador can be found in Appendix A. 
7 Ambassador John Maisto also served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States. 
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that foreign country's own citizens to gain the best possible relationship possible between 
the two governments (Maisto, 2012) .  
Ambassador George Bruno, who served as  the U .S .  Ambassador to Belize from 1994-
1997, stated that the purpose of having an embassy in another country is to, in a broad 
sense, represent U.S. interests in all aspects of bilateral interests between the United States 
and the host country. The primary importance of this representation is that the 
ambassador always conducts himself or herself in a respectful manner to the host country 
and its citizens (Bruno, 20 12) .  Ambassador David Miller, who served as the U.S. 
Ambassador to Tanzania from 1981-1984 and then to Zimbabwe from 1984 to 1986, 
believed every ambassador should always be aware of his or her actions.8 Being late, even 
by a few minutes, could signal to the host country that the United States is unhappy with 
something. Casual tardiness could not be acceptable because it could actually damage 
relations between the U.S. and the host country (Miller, 2012) .  The ambassador must be 
acutely aware of every action and statement because they are seen as the first 
representative of the United States. Most of the former ambassadors interviewed 
mentioned the need to follow "protocol." 
While real orders and directions were never specified, "protocol" seems to be a 
word that covers the respect and heightened formal manners that Bruno and Miller 
mentioned. Ambassador Philip Hughes, who served as the U.S. Ambassador to Barbados 
and the Eastern Caribbean from 1990 to 1993, stated that there is no l ist of all the standard 
protocols that all ambassadors are expected to be polite and use the correct titles when 
8 Ambassador David Miller also served as the U.S. Ambassador to the National Security Council from 1989 to 
1 9 9 1 .  
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addressing others (Hughes, 2012) .9 Ambassador Pete Peterson, who served as the U.S. 
Ambassador to Vietnam from 1997 to 2001, was also in agreement, stating that it is 
important for a U.S. ambassador to fol low protocols of who should be invited to which 
functions, how people stand, and where people are seated (Peterson, 20 12) .  
However, the State Department does have a curriculum for training new 
ambassadors, yet Hughes did not believe even this training offered any specific protocols to 
follow. Hughes suggested that one of the primary responsibilities of a U.S. ambassador is to 
always be available. He joked that the main mission of an ambassador is to not be in the 
bathroom when the U.S. president calls, but, in more seriousness, the ambassador should 
never put anyone important on hold, specifically high-ranking officials from the U.S. and 
from their host country. Again this worry over manners and availability shows how an 
ambassador is expected to uphold very rigorous manners and respectful ways of acting and 
interacting with members of the host country. Ambassador Peterson responded that all 
ambassadors must be certain that they treat the host country with an element of respect 
for that country's sovereignty and with honor for their leadership. All ambassadors should 
act in a way that complies with international norms (Peterson, 2012) .  
Ambassador Thomas Melady, the U.S. Ambassador to  Burundi from 1969 to  1972 
and then to Uganda from 1972-1973, said that one of the primary U.S .  interests he 
represented to Burundi and Uganda was a general interest and concern for the safety of 
American citizens within his host countries.10 It was important to make sure the host 
country's government understood that the safety of U.S. citizens was an important concern 
9 The Eastern Caribbean is  the general term that refers to the countries: Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent, and the Grenadines. 
10 Ambassador Melady also served as the U.S. Ambassador to the Holy See from 1989 to 1993.  
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of the United States. During his time, most of the American citizens located in Burundi and 
Uganda were affiliated either directly or indirectly with mission organizations. He kept in 
steady communications with these citizens in case a safety concern were to occur (Melady, 
2 0 12) .  
Most of the ambassadors, when asked if there was ever a crisis situation they 
needed to respond to, often noted the protocols for evacuating the embassy staff and 
notifying the American citizens if the crisis was a large, national concern. Ambassador 
Melady described a crisis in Uganda where there was an attempted coup d'etat in May of 
1972 .  While the coup was unsuccessful there was a very brutal situation that lasted three 
to four weeks, and Melady said that the primary concern for the U.S. embassy and all other 
embassies located in Uganda was for their own citizens (Melady, 2012) .  Ambassador Bruno 
had to deal with crises in Belize relating to severe weather. For example, if a hurricane 
were approaching, usually in the summer or the fall, he would follow protocol by alerting 
the U.S. citizens who were in Belize and evacuate the U.S. embassy (Bruno, 2012) .  
In the previous chapter, which examined the role of  Ambassador David Rawson 
who served in Rwanda in 1994, there was a large emphasis put on the role of protecting 
American citizens because the genocide in Rwanda was such an extreme case. Many 
Americans were specifically targeted and unfortunately some of the U.S. embassy's staff 
lost their lives. Yet even when no extreme emergency or crisis is expected, the safety of 
American citizens, according to many of the former ambassadors interviewed, remains a 
high priority for ambassadors. Ambassador Barclay mentioned the priority of American 
safety in his host country was especially high due to the constant general violence 
throughout El Salvador (Barclay, 2 0 1 1). 
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To Ambassador Maisto, the protection and safety of U.S. citizens was the number 
one priority and responsibility as ambassador. This responsibility overrode everything 
else. The ambassador and the in-country embassy must look out for the well being of any 
American citizen. If a situation occurs where an American citizen is put in jail in a foreign 
country, the U.S. consulate and the Consul General, along with his staff, have the task of 
visiting the American in jail, ensuring they have access to legal counsel, and attest that they 
are not being discriminated against. The first priority is to legally get them out of jail and 
back into the United States. Maisto also dealt with Americans who needed financial 
assistance and would help them contact a family member or friend from the U.S. who could 
provide such assistance. Maisto said that it is up to the ambassador to make sure American 
citizens within the host country know that the U.S. embassy is there for any needed 
assistance and protection (Maisto, 20 12) .  The examples Maisto gave show how his focus as 
Ambassador was very nationalistic. 
While acting in a respectful manner and keeping American citizens safe were both 
commonly cited as the main role of a U.S. ambassador, many other answers were also 
given. For example, Ambassador Peterson argued that keeping constant and transparent 
communication with the U.S. government is also an important function of the ambassador 
(Peterson, 2 0 12) .  Peterson believed that it was important to always report on what he was 
doing and the general activities of his embassy to his superiors in Washington, D.C. The 
uninterrupted communication was to prevent any surprises or discrepancies between 
what the U.S. government expected Ambassador Peterson to do and what he was actually 
doing. Here Ambassador Peterson found his role to be a steady liaison between the U.S. and 
his host country. 
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Daily Tasks and Functions of Ambassadors 
Now that we have a foundational understanding of how some ambassadors view 
their work and the most important roles they carry out as the central U.S. representative, it 
is important to next understand how they carry out these roles. Based on the my previous 
research and the research examined in the literature review, we would anticipate that the 
ambassador spend much of his time gathering communications and serving as a liaison 
between his or her host country and the United States. Ambassador Miller and Ambassador 
Hughes both described their first daily task as reading any cables that had come through to 
the embassy during the night that needed their attention. According to Hughes these cables 
could be urgent instructions from the State Department on things to do politically, specific 
U.S. views to represent to the host government, messages to be delivered, administrative 
functions, or even personnel memos. After reading through the daily cables, Ambassador 
Hugh es would call a meeting with his embassy staff to delegate tasks to the respective 
positions, such as the political-economic officer, the economic officer, the labor attache, and 
so on (Hughes, 20 12) .  Ambassador Miller would most often be engaged in meetings after 
trying to anticipate any new situations within Tanzania or Zimbabwe (Miller, 2 0 1 2) .  
Ambassador Bruno shared a similar daily schedule during h is  time as  ambassador. 
He first answered the question by responding, "Typically there is no typical day." He then 
gave some example of what his day might have included, such as dealing with a vote at the 
United Nations by the host country, welcoming a military commander or a U.S. naval ship 
that was pulling into a port to conduct training exercises with the Belizean military. 
Perhaps he would host discussions with a visiting U.S. trade delegation or have a meeting 
with the host country's drug enforcement. He would often meet with his own embassy staff 
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to discuss initiatives to combat the flow of narcotics through Central America and meet 
with the Prime Minister of Belize (Bruno, 2012) .  
Ambassador Hughes would have similar tasks throughout an ordinary day as 
ambassador to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean. He gave examples of planning trips 
with his political officers to different island nations. He would try to plan one trip each 
month with one main task to carry out. One month it would be for counter-narcotics, 
another for aid, another for security cooperation or military assistance, or perhaps for 
humanitarian relief. Hughes gave a strong example of meeting with the British and 
Canadian High Commissioners, the other two largest providers of assistance to the host 
countries, and discussed any shared concerns the three donor countries had. They would 
try to strengthen cooperation between the United States, Great Britain, and Canada by 
sharing goals and any areas they needed help with (Hughes, 20 12) .  
Many ambassadors reflected on their time spent hosting receptions and social 
parties for different government organizations and leaders. Looking again at Ambassador 
Hughes, he gave examples of hosting visiting delegations from the U.S. such as the 
American Business Club or the Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Command. The 
ambassador and his staff would organize a reception or a dinner party and invite leaders 
from within the Barbados and surrounding nations' governments. He said there was hardly 
a night when he was able to just go home after work, but always had to attend some 
gathering or cultural event to show that U.S. support and interest. Ambassador Miller 
suspected that at least three nights a week he and his wife were out at some sort of event 
or they themselves were entertaining, making his schedule active long after normal 
workday hours (2 0 1 2) .  
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Ambassador Maisto also recalled having social events almost every night, Monday 
through Fridays, and on special occasions even on the weekends. Sometimes these events 
would only call for a quick drop-in by the ambassador, perhaps for a photo opportunity. 
For some events, the ambassador would appoint another member of his staff to attend as 
his representative. Whatever the event, it was important to attend or to have a U.S. 
presence to show to the host country that the United States was active and interested. 
Maisto also gave examples of hosting visitors from the United States. If there were a 
Congressional congregation, he would try to host them in his own home. It seemed to be 
equally important for the ambassador to engage with leaders and community members of 
the host country and of the United States. It was, in general, important to put the visitors 
from the United States into contact with people from the host country, and this was done 
through social events and interactions (Maisto, 2012) .  
Besides constant meetings, discussions, and events, ambassadors must actually run 
their embassy. Ambassador Hughes said that it was his experience that the State 
Department preferred the ambassador to deal with "higher-level" activities than managing 
the embassy, especially if the ambassador was politically appointed, and instead have 
someone in a lower position to take on this role. However, Ambassador Hughes took an 
unusually active role in managing his embassy, especially during a budget crisis in which 
his embassy had to radically cut spending and become more efficient. It was his experience 
that many people took advantage of diplomatic privileges by abusing the right to bring 
goods into the country, and some people were using this duty-free privilege to stock a store 
they were operating in the United States. Because Ambassador Hughes took his 
representation of the United States very seriously, he took it upon himself to uphold the 
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U.S. reputation and pay closer attention to his own personnel to help combat some of the 
corruption and other abuses that were suspected (Hughes, 20 12) .  In order to better 
represent the United States as ambassador, Hughes carried out the role of a manager in a 
larger way than what is typical of an ambassador. 
Defining Ambassadors By Significant Tasks Accomplished 
While understanding the general tasks that ambassadors carry out each day as our 
U.S. representative abroad, their true role can be synonymous with their most significant 
tasks that were achieved outside of their daily meetings and events. Each former 
ambassador was asked to comment on their most significant task that they accomplished 
during their time of service. 
Ambassador Miller served in Tanzania from 1981-1984 and commented that his 
most significant task was helping to negotiate peace and prevent a civil war in South Africa. 
He used his influence in Tanzania to pressure the Tanzanian government to remove their 
troops from Angola and Mozambique, which was a very important step to the South African 
government. South Africa lived in fear of Communism and so Ambassador Miller helped 
alleviate any threats by pressuring the Cuban troops to withdraw from the region. 
Ambassador Miller also worked hard to have South Africa release Mr. Nelson Mandela, 
which he considers to be the most significant result of his work as ambassador. Miller is a 
great example of the traditional diplomatic role, negotiating between multiple countries, 
using a complex political strategy with multiple players to achieve a goal. He recognized 
that he served a long time ago, reminding that his region of command in Africa was under 
Eisenhower (Miller, 2012) .  
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Ambassador Barclay cited his most significant accomplishment as improving the 
economic and social initiatives within his host country. His main goal was to improve the 
overall Gross Domestic Product of El Salvador, recognizing the importance of economic 
development. He saw a strong connection between the economic security of El Salvador 
and trade relations and security between El Salvador and the United States. Violence within 
El Salvador was a central problem; one that Barclay believed could be solved with better 
economic opportunities for those creating the violence (Barclay, 2 0 1 1) .  The violence 
during this time was hurting the tourism industry and other business opportunities that 
would help raise El Salvador's Gross Domestic Product, as Barclay hoped. Barclay 
successfully won a grant from the Millennium Challenge Corporation for $46 1 to promote 
economic development within the north of El Salvador (Danilovich :  2006). His work with 
development was seen as so significant that he was awarded "Noble Friend of El Salvador," 
the highest honor that can be given by this country to a non-citizen. When the President of 
El Salvador recognized Barclay with this award, he did so by commending his efforts in 
economic and social development (Press Release: 2 006) .  
Barclay served from 2003-2007, about twenty years after Ambassador Miller served 
in Tanzania. While this was only one comparison between two former U.S. ambassadors, it 
is clear how different each ambassador's significant roles were where Barclay's was 
focused on economic development in contrast to the negotiations and political tactics 
Miller accomplished. 
Ambassador Pete Peterson served as ambassador to Vietnam from 1997-2001 as 
the first U.S. ambassador to Vietnam since the Vietnam War. His main focus was on 
establishing strong diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam. He says he 
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was able to accomplish this with many different methods, but above all he recognized the 
need of establishing a strong economic relationship. If the United States had a strong 
economic relationship with Vietnam, then a strong diplomatic relationship would also 
ensue, in which human rights and other U.S. interests could be agreed upon. Peterson 
credits his success in creating a strong relationship with Vietnam by focusing on economic 
issues, or development. He helped begin Vietnam entry into negotiations with the World 
Trade Organization that would help with environmental, transportation, and financial 
issues. He also worked extensively in developing the human rights advancement of 
Vietnam, particularly with recognizing different religions. 
As a result of Peterson's work, Vietnam recognizes the authority of virtually every 
religion in the world, which was not true when he arrived in 1997. These large steps in 
economic and social initiatives allowed Vietnam to become a stronger regional player 
within Asia and helped them to become a contemporary member of the United Nations 
Security Council (Peterson, 2012) .  Peterson is another example of how development, both 
economic and social, plays a crucial role within U.S. diplomacy and how development was 
the focal point of U.S. relations with another country. 
Ambassador Maisto recalled his most significant tasks in Nicaragua as being a 
strong ally of Nicaragua's newly democratically elected government. He was proud of the 
work he did with the U.S. economic assistance program in which he oversaw nine hundred 
million dollars of aid to, at that time during the mid 1990s, the second poorest country in 
the Western Hemisphere. During his time in Venezuela, Maisto was proud of his negotiated 
tax treaty, which has become one of the model tax treaties in the world. As in Nicaragua, 
Maisto was proud of his work done with the government in Venezuela. He spent a 
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significant amount of time with the new government, specifically with Hugo Chavez, 
explaining U.S.  policy and representing the United States as a willing partner and ally 
(Maisto, 2 012) .  
Development Becoming New Focus of Diplomacy 
From almost every response of these former ambassadors, working with economic 
and social development initiatives within their host country was a central focus of their 
work, so much so that their most significant tasks were centered around their 
accomplishments within development. Only one ambassador did not have an economic 
initiative cited as his most significant accomplishment, and he served the earliest out of 
those ambassadors interviewed, suggesting that development has more recently become 
increasingly important. In this section the research will continue to look at the responses 
from the personal interviews with the selected former U.S. ambassadors to better 
understand if and how development was a common aspect of their daily work Based on 
the previous research, we would anticipate that economic and social development of the 
host country is indeed becoming a stronger focus for U.S. ambassadors. 
Ambassador Melady, who served in Burundi, said he spent a great part of his time 
working with development organizations within his host country. He understood before he 
arrived that much of his focus as ambassador would need to be on development because of 
his particular country. He knew a big problem in Burundi was what he calls the "unholy 
trinity" of poverty, illiteracy, and disease, and the only way to help ease these problems 
would be to work with the local Burundi government to enthusiastically and forcefully face 
these three main challenges. He cited working extensively with the United Nations and 
other international organizations that were helping advance economic initiatives within 
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Burundi. One of these organizations was the World Health Organization who was there 
during his time to help combat a whooping cough epidemic. Melady said that it was U.S. 
policy for him to help with and to make any suggestions to things regarding economic 
development. Melady said the economic development of Burundi was his first concern as 
ambassador (Melady, 20 12) .  
Ambassador Hugh es also said that over fifty percent of his  personnel were involved 
in working with development. He worked regularly with the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and tried to keep involved with their programs and 
serve as an advocate for the different projects they were working on. He noted that it was 
not within his role as U.S. ambassador to shape USAID's policy, but it was his job to monitor 
their progress and to stay knowledgeable about their programs. Ambassador Bruno also 
had a similar experience in working with USAID. Yet during his time there were individuals 
from the U.S .  who worked with non-governmental organizations doing different 
development projects such as providing medical care, teaching children, or even excavating 
Mayan ruins for cultural purposes (Bruno, 2012) .  
Ambassador Miller recalled that he  also worked a lot with development 
organizations in both Tanzania and Zimbabwe. During his time, the United States was the 
largest donor of aid to Zimbabwe, meaning it was a large part of Miller's role to work with 
development, particularly with activities provided by non-governmental organizations. In 
Tanzania Miller was heavily involved with the Peace Corps mission. He commented that his 
wife, especially, took a very active role in advocating for development. Miller and his wife 
toured the countryside and noted that one of the most efficient economic projects going on 
at the time was a women's cooperative. Mrs. Miller become involved in financing these 
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women through small $500 grants so women could organize themselves for efficient 
purchasing and other financial activities to better their economic situations. Miller 
confirmed that indeed he spent a lot of his time on development issues in both of his host 
countries, as did his wife (Miller, 2012) .  
For  Ambassador Peterson, who had to begin diplomatic relations between the 
United States and Vietnam, there was no USAID mission or any other large governmental 
organization in place for promoting economic development. To begin with, Peterson said 
he worked closely with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other 
financial organizations. He also worked with the United Nations on refugee issues and 
disaster preparedness. He had to work to convince USAID to come into the country and 
they were slower than what Hughes had anticipated, but he was proud to say that USAID 
now has a very large presence in Vietnam with many different development programs 
being carried out. Peterson, when commenting on the amount of time he spent working 
with various development organizations, said that working on development issues is 
something "ambassadors do without even thinking, it is so common" (2012) .  
Ambassador Barclay and his work with development issues in  El Salvador were 
already mentioned in the previous section. He continued to explain his development work 
by partnering extensively with the U.S. military. Oftentimes he would have the military 
come to E l  Salvador for military training exercises, and afterwards they would do 
development work. One example he gave was how the U.S. military built a temporary 
hospital in a rural area of El Salvador, and after administering aid and medical attention to 
the surrounding area, they would move the hospital to another region and repeat the 
medical work. Barclay believed the military did a lot of good work with their economic and 
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social development projects, especially regarding this example of a hospital, and he would 
often times partner with the military to carry-out similar initiatives (Barclay, 20 12) .  
Barclay gave one brief example of  how the military has carried out projects to enhance the 
economic and social conditions in foreign countries. Chapter four will explore the role of 
the U.S. military in more depth, regarding how the military fits into diplomatic affairs and 
performing international development work. 
It is quite clear that these ambassadors spent a great deal of time meeting with 
development and aid organizations, keeping up-to-date on different projects, suggesting 
and advocating for ideas, and overall taking an active role in the economic and social 
improvement of their host countries. In the previous section many of the ambassadors' 
most significant accomplishments were centered on development achievements, and this 
section portrayed a general idea of just how involved with development work the 
ambassadors were. Development was a central concern of the U.S. ambassadors and 
therefore a large component of the function of ambassadors and a core piece of U.S. 
diplomacy. 
Conclusion 
While ambassadors inarguably serve as the foremost representative of the United 
States and its interests abroad, there existed a gap in understanding. Sharp advocates for a 
better understanding of how diplomacy fits within international relations, and this chapter 
used interviews and case studies of individual former U.S. ambassadors to better 
understand the role of ambassadors within U.S. diplomacy (1999:39) .  Sharp also admits 
that diplomacy is in decline, yet even this decline is poorly understood. This chapter found 
that diplomacy in a traditional sense is indeed declining. Traditional negotiating has been 
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replaced by a strong emphasis on development as it relates to U.S. security. According to 
the former ambassadors interviewed, their significant tasks included achieved 
development goals and improved economic standards for their host country. In order to 
achieve such initiatives, Clinton argues that diplomacy and the tactics that are still revered 
within diplomacy, such as negotiating, are crucial (2010 :  1 5) .  
These interviews provide direct support for Clinton's argument i n  her review. For 
example, Clinton recognizes that the material conditions, or the economic situations, of 
people directly affect U.S. national security policies. If development objectives are properly 
reached, then development can be one of the best tools to forward U.S. stability within our 
world. Because of this, U.S. ambassadors and others within the State Department must be 
better trained to work on issues of economic and social development (Clinton, 20 10 :  18) .  
Development i s  one o f  the most effective aspects that a U.S. ambassador can work with 
while representing the United States and promoting our interests abroad. 
From the personal interviews of former U.S. ambassadors, the daily tasks, long-term 
goals, and overall trends of U.S. diplomatic efforts can be better understood. Each 
ambassador interviewed had a very specific view of their role and how to define it. Their 
daily routines of meetings and work with development organizations described how they 
carried out their own defined functions. The significant tasks accomplished showed an 
emphasis on economic and social development work as opposed to negotiations and peace 
treaties of traditional diplomacy. This emphasis on international development is mirrored 
and reaffirmed in Secretary of State Clinton's report on the State Department and the 
strategies that need to be assumed to forward U.S. relations by combining development 
with diplomacy. 
58 
With a greater understanding of the daily tasks these lower-profile ambassadors 
performed each day as U.S. ambassadors, we can begin to answer the questions many 
previous scholars have asked. Some scholars argued that diplomacy is irrelevant and the 
role of the diplomat is only preserved for tradition (Sharp, 1999; Cooper, 1999 :  20, 17 4; 
Stearns, 1973 :  163) .  The evidence from the personal interviews show that U.S. 
ambassadors see themselves as the direct representation of the United States and actively 
give support to the host countries. They are the link between on-the-ground situations and 
U.S. policy makers in Washington, D.C. Their link is important because they are kept up to 
speed on every piece of news and current affairs, each day, within their country. 
Ambassador Maisto put it best that he needed to know everything that was happening, 
regardless of its importance, because the most important thing was that ne never be 
surprised by something, so that the leaders in the U.S. will never be surprised (Maisto, 
20 12) .  
The ambassador serves as  the formal link in  communications. Even though 
technology enables news to be spread faster and easier around the world, an ambassador 
lives within the country, has a broad knowledge of the political climate, understands the 
role of each actor within the U.S. embassy, the host country's government, and even things 
such as opposition movements. Therefore the ambassador serves to put the current affairs 
in their host government into a larger context that is not always captured by the media. 
Therefore the ambassador still plays a critical role as an in-country source of information 
and conceptual "glue" that puts together every small piece of information into a larger 
frame of reference between the host country and the United States. The evidence here is in 
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line with both Cooper and Sharp. Cooper believed that the "classic functions" of 
ambassadors, specifically representation, wil l  continue to stay important (1999 :2 1) .  
This research showed a strong focus on protocol, or the standard operating 
procedures that all ambassadors are expected to follow and how information and decision­
making is processed and decided upon throughout the State Department bureaucracy. 
These protocols reinforce Allison's ideas from his three-model process. Ambassadors are a 
key element in the making of U.S. foreign policy. While  they do not necessarily have the 
power to individually shift the U.S. agenda towards their host country, there are specific 
steps they take to suggest their ideas to the correct people within the State Department and 
the chain of command is strictly followed. Many of these ambassadors gave examples of 
crisis situations in which they follow procedures to first protect the lives of U.S. citizens. 
The responses by these ambassadors mirror the importance of standard operating 
procedures that Ambassador Rawson showed in the last chapter. Ambassadors are 
relevant to U.S. diplomacy by uniformly responding to situations and following certain 
protocol that begins the process of forming U.S. foreign policy. In affect, ambassadors are 
the first responders to any situation between the United States and the host country. 
Yet the evidence also shows that the substance of an ambassador's agenda is 
shifting. Clinton has already pushed for a stronger emphasis on international development, 
and the ambassadors interviewed cited many examples of working with development 
organizations and setting goals for their host country's economic and social improvement. 
Here is where ambassadors need to adapt to stay relevant. The State Department does not 
have the resources necessary to carry out all of the projects and initiatives that are 
important for maintaining stable relations between foreign countries and the United States. 
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Instead, the U.S. military holds these resources that can provide substantial 
development projects. The role of the military is becoming larger within the diplomatic 
sphere of international relations, threatening the relevance of the ambassador figure in 
carrying out U.S. foreign policy, especially in regards to economic and social initiatives. 
While this chapter did not examine this  aspect of the Ambassadorial experience, but the 
following chapter will do so. 
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Chapter 4: The New Diplomatic Role of the United States Military 
Introduction 
The practice of United States diplomacy, while internally changing, is also being 
affected by outside factors such as the mass media and technological innovations. Yet 
perhaps the strongest outside factor is the role of the U.S. military in foreign policy. It is 
common today to hear examples of military "nation-building" projects such as 
administering food, medicine, building schools, and training foreign police forces 
throughout the world. The military seems to have an increasing role in the formal relations 
between the United States and the world, a role that has been traditionally carried out by 
ambassadors. Dana Priest examines this current phenomenon and focuses special attention 
on the role of the military's Commander-in-Chiefs, now known as the Unified Combatant 
Commanders. The U.S.  military has divided the world into regions of command, one of 
which is the Central Command. Priest analyzes the Unified Combatant Commander of 
Central Command, General Anthony Zinni, who began his position in 1998. 1 1  He  
commanded the region most widely accepted as  the Middle East, which included parts of  
West Africa and Central Asia. For this study h is  position will be  referred to  the current title, 
that is, UCC. Zinni's legacy from 1998 through 2001  was full of very diplomatic-flavored 
projects and with his relations with other heads of state, who expected him to help solve 
problems that would generally be sought from an ambassador (Priest, 2004:  94) .  
Priest gives specific examples of  such diplomatic relations General Zinni held within 
his region of control. The General would go falcon hunting with Saudi Arabia's royal family, 
1 1  The countries within General Anthony Zinni's region of control were: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. 
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be invited to traditional tribal dances in Kenya, and led humanitarian relief and aid efforts 
in Mogadishu (Priest, 2004: 70). Many leaders would ask him to help solve their problems 
of civil wars, terrorism, and even large-scale starvation (Priest, 2004:  68).  All of these 
things are not what a four-star military general traditionally does, but instead what a 
traditional United States ambassador would be expected to include in trying to further 
benefit relations between their host country and the United States. As Priest's prime 
example, General Zinni embodies the general direction the military has recently been 
taking. Priest portrays Zinni as a strong example as a military general that assumes a 
greater role in development, personal relationships with foreign leaders, and other 
diplomatic duties. Building upon Priest's research, this chapter will use the evidence from 
an interview conducted with General Zinni to further examine the military's new role 
within diplomacy. 
My interview with Zinni will test multiple hypotheses, all of which come mostly 
from Priest's review of General Zinni in The Mission along with the data gathered from my 
interviews with former U.S. Ambassadors noted in the previous chapters. 1213The first 
hypothesis is that the military has many more available resources, especially budgetary, 
than does the State Department. The second is that the military is viewed by leaders 
around the world as having diplomatic status, potentially with more influence than the U.S. 
ambassadors in those countries. The last hypothesis is that economic and social 
development is linked with the U.S. military's security goals and therefore is becoming 
increasingly important Priest also provides a comprehensive background of Zinni's military 
1 2 This research protocol was approved by the Eastern Illinois University I nstitutional Review Board on 
November 1 8, 2 0 1 1 .  File Number: 1 1 - 156. 
13 The interview questions asked to General Zinni can be found in Appendix B. 
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career and personal traits and beliefs that will supplement many of his interview 
responses. 
Hypothesis 1 :  
The Military Has Increasing Diplomatic Influence Because of its Available Resources 
General Zinni, when asked about the military's resources, agreed that indeed his 
resources as a Unified Combatant Command, or UCC, and the resources of the military, in 
general, overshadow those of the State Department. He goes so far as to say, "They (the 
State Department) had nowhere near the resources we had in scope and scale" (Zinni, 
20 1 2) .  The State Department was aware of this and was frustrated with its l imits in 
resources. General Zinni took it upon himself to never try to overshadow the formal U.S. 
diplomatic side of  relations within his region of command, recognizing the importance of 
the diplomats' work and the necessary cooperation between the State Department and the 
military. 
Priest also examines the question of an imbalance of resources between the military 
and the State Department. She cites the fact that Zinni's budget was always classified and 
never directly accounted for in the budget. By keeping it as an unidentified part of the 
Department of Defense's overall budget, Congress could never take it away. The UC C's 
budget would be decided among the officials within the Department of Defense, therefore it 
was never decided upon within the political sphere, like the State Department's budget is 
decided upon (Priest, 2004: 1 14). 
Apart from financial resources, Priest argues that the military, Zinni in particular, 
had more freedom and access for travel and communication. The ability to travel around 
the world is, as Priest says, the best intelligence weapon that Zinni had (2004: 76) .  Zinni 
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had an extensive convoy including his own Boeing 707, multiple pilots, mechanics, satellite 
radios and phones, aides, cooks, personal assistants, and even am armored BMW (Priest, 
2004:  7 6) .  Zinni himself argues that while the military does have much more control over 
their financial budget, money is not the only reason the military has been growing in 
diplomatic influence. He says that their presence, which is more exaggerated than the 
presence of the U.S. diplomats, helps their reputation with countries' leaders, and this 
increased presence is a result of their ability to move and to communicate around the 
world (Zinni, 2 0 12) .  
The lack of resources from the State Department also contributes to  the military's 
rise in influence. Zinni gave examples of the sort of "nation-building" projects that were 
done under his command. When doing a report on Iraq, the military was the branch 
running zoos, swimming pools, reconnecting energy grids, and establishing anti-corruption 
task forces. The military is involved in these projects and others that involve political, 
economic, and social reconstruction because, in part, "the State Department just doesn't 
have the resources" (Zinni, 20 12) .  Development is so important that when the State 
Department cannot carry out everything that is needed at the time, partially due to their 
lack of resources, the military steps in to complete them. The limits on the State 
Department's resources allow for the military to use their own and in turn their diplomatic 
influence and involvement in development and other political initiatives grows. Zinni 
believed that while the State Department may have been frustrated, and presumably still is, 
with their resource l imitations, they were pleased that these projects were still being 
completed. He goes on to say that he always tried to help everyone he could. Often times he 
worked more closely with countries that were a higher priority to U.S. foreign policy, such 
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as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan (Zinni, 2 0 1 2) .  During Zinni's time as a UCC he worked 
very closely with the State Department because both sides understood that the military had 
the necessary resources. 
Many ambassadors have shared their frustration with their own budget restrictions. 
When asked about the military's increasing role in influencing U.S. foreign policy, some 
agree that this is indeed happening, and attribute to it to their larger budget. Ambassador 
Pete Peterson, who served in Vietnam from 1998-2 001, said that the military did not have a 
large influence in Vietnam during his time. He did have the Secretary of Defense visit 
Vietnam as a part of a project in recovering the bodies of missing soldiers and prisoners-of­
war from the Vietnam conflict, however the military was not carrying out any diplomatic­
related projects themselves. Recognizing the new trend in U.S.  foreign relations, 
Ambassador Peterson believed the military's growing influence is a direct result of their 
budget. The State Department's budget has been decreasing over the years while the 
Department of Defense' budget has not. The military simply has the available funds to 
influence diplomatic relations abroad (Peterson, 20 12) .  Ambassador Hughes, who served 
as ambassador to Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean from 1990 to 1993, also recognized 
the influence that the military's regional commanders had in "pulling Washington's purse 
strings" (Hughes, 2 012) .  While the military was not very active within his host countries, 
he wished they had been more so because they could have used their own resources to help 
the military troops in the Eastern Caribbean, such as rebuilding their barracks. Even when 
the military did not have a strong diplomatic presence, this ambassador recognized the 
benefits of partnering with the military and using the military's resources to help the host 
country. 
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Zinni also gave special attention to how the military helped the State Department 
with diplomatic relations outside of development proj ects. He said that entertaining is 
incredibly important to interact with local leadership, and often the U.S. ambassadors had 
very small budgets to entertain. Here Zinni would take the military band from one country 
to another for ambassador events. Perhaps he would take a military ship into a port, have 
the military carry-out a civic action program, and then in the evening host an event for the 
local and the U.S .  leadership to interact. No matter what sort of project, Zinni would always 
give credit to the U.S .  ambassador of that country. He would have his troops work with 
another country's military to train them to be more responsible with hazardous waste 
exposal, and give credit to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the ambassador. 
Another example Zinni gives is when the military would rebuild a school or perhaps paint a 
clinic, he would always have the ambassador take responsibility and to cut the ribbon. 
(Zinni, 2 0 12) .  These are examples of not j ust the military carrying out their own 
diplomatic-related projects, but actually serving as the liaison between the host country 
and the U.S. ambassador - being diplomats of the U.S. and for the U.S. 
Zinni believed that his position within the military as a UCC also allowed him more 
direct contact with leaders in Washington. Zinni, as a UCC, answered directly to the 
Secretary of Defense Wil liam Cohen and then to President Clinton. His chain of command 
was incredibly short, especially compared to the chain of command that most ambassadors 
must follow in the State Department. Cohen relied heavily on his UCCs and therefore 
arranged for Zinni and the other regional commanders to meet one-on-one with the 
president several times each year. According to Zinni, President Clinton appreciated these 
meetings and because of the direct contact with the UCCs he was very engaged with the 
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military's plans, ideas, and how these commanders viewed their personal roles (Zinni, 
2 0 1 2) .  Having such a direct route to the resources of the President and the Secretary of 
Defense's opinions, authority, and support allowed Zinni to have much more influence and 
power than an ambassador. Zinni understands that the State Department does not have the 
same sort of direct connection with the policy makers in Washington, D.C. as he had during 
his time as UCC (Zinni, 2012) .  
Many of the ambassadors interviewed shared their frustration in working with the 
thick bureaucracy that makes up the State Department. When trying to work in shaping 
foreign policy, the State Department follows the communication lines of a rigorous 
hierarchy. Ambassador Peterson, the former ambassador to Vietnam, says that working 
with the State Department "absolutely drove [him] crazy" because of the naturally slow­
pace of decisions made within the department (Zinni, 20 12) .  
Hypothesis 2 :  
The Military is viewed as Having A Higher Status than U.S. Diplomats 
Zinni recognized that the military has a strong and growing diplomatic influence 
around the world, and this was especially apparent with his own experiences as UCC. He 
agrees with statements made by President Clinton that the U.S. has an "over-militarized 
foreign policy." While the military's resources are a large part of this, Zinni describes other 
factors that allow the military to be a strong influence in diplomatic relations. These 
include a shared militaristic history with country leaders, a great time spent in country, and 
an emphasis on the history and culture of not just one country, but on an entire region. 
These factors help the military carryout their "nation-building" projects and allow them the 
reputation of being the face of the U.S. around the world (Zinni, 20 12) .  
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Zinni describes his time as UCC as being treated with a tremendous amount of 
respect. Priest retells stories of how leaders would take Zinni by the hand and lead him 
around their palaces. General Zinni attributes these close relations and the respect he 
received to a militaristic background he shared with many of the leaders. He gave an 
example of relating to the former Egyptian President Muhammad Hosni El Sayed Mubarak 
at the time because they both had a common military career. This was true with many of 
the political leaders Zinni encountered, who came to power by rising through military 
ranks. The concerns they brought to Zinni had a military focus, such as issues security, 
training, and equipment (Zinni, 20 12) .  The U.S. ambassadors were often politically 
appointed, often times coming from a career in business, or most of their careers was spent 
within the Foreign Service. Zinni believes the political leaders within his Central Command 
more easily related to him because both sides shared a strong similarity with the military, 
and this helped the leaders see Zinni as an equal, as someone who quickly understood their 
concerns and knew how to help. 
Zinni gave great attention and thought to the culture of the region under his 
command. Priest describes Zinni's concern for understanding Vietnam's unique culture 
when he fought during the Vietnam war, realizing that success of any mission could only 
come from understanding the troubles of other nations (2004: 65) .  He continued 
experiencing the need of cultural understanding while fighting in the Gulf War. He himself 
stated, "the context of the culture was critically important" (Zinni, 20 12) .  Zinni was 
strongly impacted as he watched the Kurds in Iraq starve and fight over food, giving up 
their children in hopes the military could give them medical care, trying to solve who in the 
Kurdish tribes were the decision-makers so his troops could deliver assistance (Priest, 
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2004:  66) .  Throughout his military career Zinni constantly fought to understand as much as 
he could, a trait that easily helped him connect and form relationships with the higher 
political leaders when he was UCC. Ambassadors are expected to understand the culture 
and traditions of whatever country they are serving in, and Zinni, understanding the 
importance of this knowledge to any military mission, followed these diplomatic protocols. 
Again we see Zinni act in a diplomatic fashion, even as a military general. 
Seventy percent of his time, Zinni reports, was dedicated to traveling around the 
region (Zinni, 2 0 12) .  He would try to divide up his travel between four areas to make sure 
he gave the deserved attention and focus to each part of his command. The first area was 
East Africa, Jordan, and Egypt, the second was the Arabian Peninsula, the third was Iran 
and the surrounding countries, and the fourth was Central Asia and Pakistan. Zinni spent 
much of his time in multiple countries, creating a stronger presence than one ambassador 
from one country could. The military also developed strategies with a regional-scope 
instead of a strategy for just one country (Zinni, 2012) .  Because their jurisdiction through 
the U.S.  military is larger than the jurisdiction for one ambassador, their presence is greater 
known, and they are easily seen as having more authority because their authority is more 
wide-spread than a single ambassador's. Zinni gave the example of General David Petraeus: 
he questions if anyone can name the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, but almost everyone could 
name Petraeus, showing that indeed, more attention is given to the military commanders 
because they are seen as the face of U.S. policy (Zinni, 2012) .  He believes that the local 
people throughout the Central Command looked at the UCC and other regional 
commanders as having clout and authority, and Zinni assumed that reputation (Zinni, 
20 12) .  
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Additionally, Zinni agreed that as a UCC he had a lot of flexibility in shaping U.S. 
foreign policy within his region (Zinni, 20 12) .  While the large military budget and presence 
within the region helped Zinni have greater influence, he mentions the distinct culture of 
the military. The military has a strong culture of planning with more specialized people 
who were trained to work quickly through tough issues. Their planning, especially under 
the command of Zinni, incorporated cultural, social, political, and economic issues. Zinni 
argues that because of their detailed planning, the military often had a more forceful, 
comprehensive, and strategic design than what the State Department could come up with. 
This is because the State Department first does not have the resources necessary, but more 
importantly their culture is not based around planning (Zinni, 20 12) .  He cited one of the 
most frustrating aspects of being CinC was having a strong military plan for a specific 
project, and other departments, such as the United States Agency for International 
Development, having no plan of their own for reconstruction or stabilization. The military 
has many more people within the region that are specialized in more areas than the State 
Department, and because everyone is trained to work in a certain way and their entire 
culture is based in planning, they often have the upper hand when influencing U.S. foreign 
policy over the State Department. 
Hypothesis 3 :  
Economic and Political Development Has Increasing Importance to Military Missions 
Throughout his military career, Zinni discovered the importance of humanitarian 
aid and relief partnered with and a thorough understanding of local customs and history to 
the success of military missions (Priest, 2004:  66) .  As a UCC he was in charge of missions 
that included security and environmental issues to economic assistance. This is, Zinni said, 
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because the nature of combat has changed. Conventionally soldiers would fight on a 
battlefield and then someone else would "clean up the mess" and re-stabilize the broken 
society. Now, the military must keep a society stable during conflict, and so the social and 
economic problems are a concern from the very beginning of any mission. Zinni argues that 
the military component is actually subordinate to the development of the society; therefore 
the military must be more involved in the political, economic, and social reconstruction 
(Zinni, 2 0 12) .  Therefore the military is in charge of projects, as stated above, such as 
managing public swimming pools alongside establishing anti-corruption task forces. 
One part of the new importance on development as a military tool is that many 
security issues are linked to economic issues. General Zinni cited this strategy as beginning 
under President Jimmy Carter and President Ronald Reagan, who both deemed the 
protection of gas and oil resources as critically important. The economic mission of 
protecting gas and oil dates back to the Cold War. Protecting these natural resources 
involves other issues such as access to the region, freedom of navigation, and economic 
components involving the local economies and international trade and finance. For 
example, protecting the Suez Canal involved both security and economic aspects. Any 
threat to freedom of navigation and commercial trading to such an important world­
trading route is also entwined with the economic livelihood of the region. Zinni even 
argued that any threat to this route is entwined with the economics of the rest of the world 
(Zinni, 2 0 12) .  
Ambassador David Rawson, who served in Rwanda at the beginning of the Rwandan 
genocide, shared his experiences of working with the military during an extraordinary 
humanitarian mission after the genocide. He described the mission as a j oint operation 
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between himself and the State Department and the military, in which he worked closely 
with the military general and the troops on the ground in Rwanda. There were visits by 
United Nations commander of Europe, General Joint Chief of Staffs, and from the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense (Zinni, 2012) .  Here we see the ambassador and the military working 
closely on development and aid projects in the light of a large-scale humanitarian crisis. 
While the economic situation of the Central Command countries closely impacted its 
security threats, Zinni is also noted for his general views on development. Priest quotes 
some of Zinni's questions, such as "What is our obligation to the world?" Zinni believes that 
Americans should care about the development of other countries throughout the world 
because a more stable world does benefit us. If we, as Americans, are generally better off 
than most of the world, he believes we should accept this and help other countries develop 
because it is simply the right thing to do (Priest, 2004:  1 17).  Zinni believes that if the 
United States, both the overall public and the national policy makers, decided to use 
development initiatives to truly increase the values of human rights and democracy in 
developing countries, that we would make a much greater difference in the world (Priest, 
2 004: 1 1 7) . That difference, while morally sound, would also directly benefit our own 
security and economic relations. 
Conclusion 
When asked about the future direction of the military's involvement with "nation­
building" activities and its increased role in U.S. foreign policy, Zinni answered that we 
must simply l egitimize the military's involvement. His suggestion is to create a separate 
command for such economic and social development strategies so that it is not solely the 
military that has all the resources, control, and authority over such plans. Yet the major 
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effort would be to change the culture of entire departments, such as the Department of 
State, in order to have effective plans and be able to muster the necessary resources to 
carry out and execute real development initiatives. General Zinni believes the U.S. 
government lacks the integration between departments that would help carry-out 
development programs, and until that happens the military will most likely be the branch 
that will continue to control the logistics, planning, and team-building that puts these 
missions together (Zinni, 20 12) .  
The U.S. military's increasing role is very apparent when speaking with 
ambassadors who served longer ago. For example, Ambassador Melady was the former 
ambassador to Burundi and Uganda from 1969-1973,  consecutively. When asked about the 
military's presence in his host countries when he served, he only met with a military 
attache once a month (Melady, 20 12) .  While he did not have personal experience with a 
large military presence in his host countries, he believes that their increasing role is due to 
larger security threats. In parts of Africa, especially, the U.S. government has greater 
interest in neutralizing terrorist activity and therefore has an increasing presence to help 
dissolve increasing security threats. This could potentially be another factor for the 
military's new diplomatic role, however Zinni does not mention larger security threats as a 
potential factor. 
Similar to Ambassador Melady, Ambassador Miller, who served in Tanzania and 
Zimbabwe from 1981-1986, consecutively, did not experience a large military presence in 
his host country. He recognized that during his time of service the military did not have 
near the power or the authority they have today (Miller, 2012) .  He did not have an 
observation as to why the military has more influence today than in the 1980s, but the fact 
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that he recognized there has been a significant shift over this time period suggests the 
military is indeed sharing a larger role in diplomatic relations. 
From Zinni and his experiences as a UCC, the large influence the military is gaining 
within U.S. foreign policy is better understood. The military has a large budget, seemingly 
limitless resources, and a culture that puts them in more control over the projects the U.S. 
carries out around the world. As UCC, Zinni used his power to form close relationships with 
political leaders in the Central Command and emphasized the importance of cultural 
understanding when dealing with both security and economic issues. His time as UCC 
showed that the ambassadors in the region were not always considered the first 
representative of the United States, but in fact Zinni was .  This is easily the result of a 
mutual military backgrounds and the large amount of time Zinni spent within the region, 
and yet Zinni gives multiple examples of common situations in which he and the military 
served as the liaison between foreign political leaders and the U.S. ambassadors. 
Ambassadors should serve as the liaison between these political leaders and the U.S. 
government, and yet Zinni seems to have served as an ambassador to the ambassador. 
While  Zinni is j ust one example, his example is significant and heeds to the fact that U.S 
diplomacy is not only being carried out by our official appointed ambassadors, but also 
instead it seems the military's new role is here to stay. 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
Diplomacy is the act and tradition that holds together the relations between the 
United States and foreign countries. It has a longstanding history as an elite and respected 
position, a role that can only be fulfilled by certain types of individuals (Sharp, 1999: 5; 
Stearns, 1973 :  1 54 ) . These individuals have striven to represent the United States properly, 
promote U.S. interests, communicate between governments, negotiate peace, pressure 
actions, and all other work that is needed in the daily work of an ambassador. 
It must be noted that there are some limitations to this study. First, only eight 
ambassadors and one military general were available to be interviewed. The ambassadors 
all served in developing countries. Because of the economic status of the countries in which 
they served, international development may have been more important to their work than 
it would be to an ambassador who served in a developed country. For example, 
Ambassador Maisto served in both Nicaragua and Venezuela. At his time of service 
Nicaragua was considered an extremely underdeveloped country where Venezuela was 
one of  the richest countries in Latin America. He clearly stated that because of Venezuela's 
economic status, no attention was needed on international development because the 
United States did not have any development projects there. Maisto spent more time 
working on economic and social development work in Nicaragua because of the existing 
poor economic state of Nicaragua (Maisto, 2 0 1 1) .  While this is an obvious fact, it should be 
noted that most of the former ambassadors interviewed served in lesser-developed 
nations. 
Yet the availability of former ambassadors was limited, and every one was included 
that was available. Fortunately the ambassadors served over a wide range of time 
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representing multiple presidential administrations. There was also a mix between Foreign 
Service career ambassadors and ambassadors who were politically appointed. While the 
number of ambassadors who were available to be interviewed was limited, the sample still 
provides a range of time and of the type of ambassador. 
Stearns tries to define the role of a diplomat and the practice of diplomacy. He states 
that diplomacy is our world's response in trying to solve complex international problems 
such as terrorism, human rights, conflict, health epidemics, and economic gaps. Yet he is 
clear that these current problems cannot be solved with traditional diplomacy. Our world's 
nations must find new ways to work together, and "greater diplomatic effort will be 
required" (Stearns, 1996: 18) .  This research tried to find in what ways diplomacy must 
shift to better combat the demanded solutions of international problems. 
To do so, this research used a method built by Graham Allison (1969) that follows 
the decision-making process of U.S. foreign policy and breaks it down into three different 
components: the national level, the organizational model, and the bureaucratic politics 
model. Chapter two applied Allison's model to the case of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The 
three models looked at President Bill Clinton's rational choices, the standard operating 
procedures of the State Department, and then the internal politics within the bureaucracy 
of the State Department. This research was unique in that a personal interview was 
conducted with the former ambassador to Rwanda, David Rawson, who was present at the 
time of the outbreak of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. His responses helped supplement the 
direction decisions were made throughout Allison's three levels, and provided a clearer 
comprehension of what the role of an ambassador is within such an extreme case. 
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Chapter three focused away from one specific case study to look at U.S. diplomacy in 
more general terms. The telephone interviews indicate how diplomacy has shifted from the 
traditional days of negotiations and stiff political formalities. The day-to-day tasks and 
large contributions U.S. ambassadors left as their legacies show the importance of 
diplomacy, as most previous scholars agree to, and how diplomacy is changing. There is a 
large emphasis on international development work, suggested by the amount of time the 
ambassadors interviewed spent working with aid and development organizations, and 
some of the individuals' specific goals of raising their host country's GDP or operating a 
large foreign aid distribution. Secretary of State Clinton pushes for an increased link 
between diplomacy and development, for the two are becoming interdependent to 
continue beneficial relations between the United States and foreign countries. 
While diplomacy is changing within its own tactics and focuses, outside factors are 
also waging their influences. One of the largest outside factors is the U.S. military. Chapter 4 
finds why the military has such a large significance around the world and is becoming 
increasingly so within diplomatic practices. An interview with General Anthony Zinni, who 
served as the Commander-in-Chief of the Central Command, known today as a Unified 
Combatant Command, provides insights into the military's resources and bureaucratic 
structure that provides them the flexibility to influence U.S. foreign policy. General Zinni 
had great diplomatic power within his region of command. His troops had the resources to 
carry out large development projects and travel extensively to form a constant presence 
within numerous countries. Zinni's example challenges the role of our U.S. ambassadors 
and their presence, which provided strong support for Priest's findings (2003) .  
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This research provides a clearer understanding of how U.S. diplomacy is performed 
and how it is shifting to combat broader and more complex international problems. This 
understanding is crucial because the act of diplomacy is at the center of foreign relations 
and the interactions of every state. For the United States, diplomacy provides answers to 
how our foreign policy is shaped, such as in the case of the U.S. response to the Rwandan 
genocide, and how we can maintain stable and ever-forwarding relations with foreign 
countries and protect our national interests and security. Diplomacy must include 
development initiatives, as many former ambassadors have done and as Secretary of State 
Clinton believes needs to be pursued farther. Development is directly linked to security, 
and is therefore should be in the best interest of the United States. General Zinni believes 
that the U.S. military should be allowed to carry out economic, social, and political projects 
while working closely with the State Department and in-country ambassadors. The military 
has an incredible advantage over the State Department in its seemingly limitless resources 
to influence U.S. foreign policy and diplomatic relations. 
This new research implies much for U.S. policy-making. Ambassadors still rest at the 
forefront of U.S. representation to foreign nations and are responsible for presenting and 
acting on behalf of U.S .  interests. If the interest of the United States is to have increasingly 
stable relations with the rest of the world, then, as Zinni showed, U.S. security is directly 
tied to the economic development and status of other countries. Secretary of State Clinton 
also agreed with this, pushing for ambassadors to have a heavier hand in the international 
development of their host countries. Yet the State Department does not hold the resources 
to give ambassadors the opportunity to provide development projects. Instead, it is the 
military that holds a seemingly unlimited budget and an expanse of resources .  
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Therefore, the U.S. military and the State Department must find a balance, exactly 
what Clinton states (2010 :  13) .  General Zinni argued for a separate department to be 
created that could be comprised of personnel from the military, the State Department, and 
other organizations so the U.S. effort for international development would be unified 
throughout the world. Either way, here are two U.S. leaders who have, or have had, a strong 
influence in shaping U.S. foreign policy that both agree the United States needs to have a 
better balance between the State Department and the military in carrying out international 
development initiatives. 
Overall, the United States is seen as a leader within international relations and it 
must continue its strongest methods of engagement and interactions with the world:  
diplomacy. Scholars agree that diplomacy has changed but does not quite understand how. 
This research showed that much of the change is evolving around international 
development while the traditional functions of representation still remain relevant. The 
military agrees that they are increasingly influencing diplomacy. Ambassadors are 
balancing calculated public appearances with hands-on development and economic 
initiatives. And the Secretary of State is pushing for development practices to become the 
focus of diplomacy and forging stronger partnerships with the military and other 
development organizations. Diplomacy will stay the integral action in state-to-state 
interactions, but the traditional "who, what, why" is expanding to include new military 
actors and a firm emphasis on international development. I f  ambassadors adapt to the 
changing substance of U.S. foreign policy and continue to work with the military, then 
perhaps, as Cooper believes, diplomacy will become even more important to continue 
beneficial relations between the United States and the rest of the world (1997 /1998:  175) . 
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Appendix A 
Interview Questions for Former U.S. Ambassadors 
1 .  Could you describe a typical day while working in your host country? 
2 .  What i s  the most significant task you accomplished while serving a s  ambassador? 
3 .  What are some specific U.S. policies that you represented to  your host country? 
4. I f  an ambassador wanted to shift U.S. foreign policy toward their host country, how 
would they successfully do it? 
5. Was there ever a crisis or situation in which you needed to urgently respond? Could 
you describe the events that took place and the protocol you followed? 
6. Some research suggests that the American military and especially the regional 
commanders have grown substantially in diplomatic influence. Was this your 
experience as Ambassador? 
7. What was the most frustrating aspect of being an ambassador? 
8.  What are some standard protocols that al l  ambassadors are expected to follow? 
9 .  As an Ambassador, how often did you work with development organizations? 
10 .  What is one task that needs to still be accomplished to forward beneficial relations 
between the U.S. and your host country? 
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Appendix B 
Interview Questions for Former Unified Combatant Commander, Anthony Zinni 
1 .  Could you describe a typical day while being a CinC? 
2 .  M ost of my thesis is looking at the State Department, and so how often did you 
interact with the State Department? 
3 .  Were there any specific ambassadors you worked with more closely than others? 
4. I 've read Dana Priest's book and she describes you as someone who really tried to 
first understand the culture of a region. Could you explain why this is so important 
to do, especially for your military missions? 
5. How did economic and social development policies fit into your role as CinC? 
6. Another interesting dialogue that Priest explains is the close relationship you often 
had with country leaders. For example she tells the story of you being led around a 
palace by a little boy. Is that how you were normally treated throughout your 
region? 
7. Again going back to Priest, she describes diplomatic convoys in which you were in 
the lead car even though traditionally you would have been placed behind the cars 
of ambassadors. Again, was this a normal occurrence? 
8.  Priest argues that the Cine's resources completely overshadow the State 
Department's, and because of that your influence in the region is so much larger. Is 
that an accurate depiction? 
9. How much flexibility do you feel you had in shaping U.S. foreign policy? (In contrast 
to the State Department, which has very little flexibility) 
10 .  What was your most significant accomplishment? 
1 1. What was the most frustrating aspect of being a CinC? 
12 .  When looking to the future, where do you see the role of the military in terms of 
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